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Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales
Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract
Damages
Tom Baker*
If litigation is theater, insurance coverage litigation is alternately K"ng
Lear and King Richard III. In any case, in any forum, insureds can be
counted on to cast themselves as the betrayed King Lear, who, after giving
his eldest daughters his kingdom in return for their promise to love and
care for him, is cast outside in the storm.1 Insurance companies can
similarly be counted on to cast themselves as Richmond, the captain of the
forces of good who finally stopped greedy King Richard.2
Lear and Richard-both far richer characters than my one-dimensional
use of them-illustrate two contradictory forces underlying much of insur-
ance coverage litigation. Lear shows the risk inherent in paying today for
tomorrow's protection: the resulting power of the protector when that
protection is needed. Once Lear chose which daughters to reward with his
kingdom, he was dependent on them to fulfill their promise to provide for
him in old age. Richard shows the danger of giving individuals a claim on
collective resources. He schemes to control those resources and then uses
them to the disadvantage of all. In the end he is prepared to sacrifice the
entire kingdom to save himself: "A horse! A horse! My kingdom for a
horse!"3
Like Lear with his daughters, insureds are stuck with, and dependent
on, their chosen insurers in time of need. And, like Richard and his
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. B.A. 1982, J.D. 1986, Harvard
University. Thanks to Kenneth Casebeer, Mary Coombs, Stephen Diamond, Michael Fischl, Michael
Froomkin, Stephen Halpert, Robert Rosen, Stephen Schnably, and Steven Winter for comments on an
earlier draft. A presentation to the University of Miami faculty colloquium and continuing conversation
among the UM contracts faculty lunch group were very helpful to the development of this Paper. A
General Research Support Award from the University of Miami and grants from the University of
Miami Provost's Office and the University of Miami School of Law provided support for the empirical
research projects reported in this Paper.
1. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEA , KING LEAR.
2. See WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, KING RICHARD 111.




kingdom, the interests of individual insureds are often opposed to the
interests of insureds as a whole. In their extremes, Lear and Richard
illustrate two pathological sides of the insurance relationship. Because the
tensions underlying these pathologies are inescapably present in the insur-
ance relationship, the stories of Lear and Richard are always available in
a coverage case. Thus, insurance coverage litigation is simultaneously
about abandonment and greed.
As this use of Lear and Richard epitomizes, one way to explain the
obligations that exist within the insurance relationship is through stories.
I tell stories when I teach insurance. Lawyers tell stories about insurance
to judges and juries. Judges tell stories about insurance in their opinions.
And insurance companies tell stories to consumers and claimants. Like
King Lear and King Richard III, these insurance stories work by organizing
experience into a narrative structure that has a recognizable and predictable
outcome.4 For example, if the story we are told about an insurance claim
is one with a greedy and dishonest insured (Richard), we understand and
applaud a careful, detailed investigation by the insurance company; if the
story is one with a dependent, vulnerable insured (Lear), we may see in
that investigation delay and extortion.
Typically, we use these insurance stories as advocacy tools, to per-
suade another to do what we want, whether that is buying insurance, accep-
ting the denial of a claim, or deciding a case in our favor.5 But these
insurance stories have another use-a use that, while not unrelated to
advocacy, aims more at understanding the insurance relationship. The
stories we tell about insurance reveal our vision of the insurance relation-
ship, including the promises and obligations of that relationship. While the
stories I tell may be of interest to my students, the stories that insurance
companies tell are of far greater interest. These tories reveal a vision of
the insurance relationship that should matter to courts asked to determine
the obligations that inhere in that relationship.
Lawyers already use the stories insurance companies tell as a source
of obligation.' As excerpts from some judicial opinions reveal, judges do
4. See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and
Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2228 (1989) (arguing that narration can be used as
persuasive authority "because it evokes meaning that is already institutionalized"). See generally
Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) (discussing the use of storytelling in
legal discourse and scholarship). A recent review of the legal narrative literature and responses to it
is Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994) (arguing that criticism towards
legal storytelling is misguided and positing that legal storytelling should he used to challenge definitions
of terms that have been taken for granted).
5. See generally Gerald P. LUpez, LayLawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing the use
of "stock stories"-stories that rely heavily on characteristic people and their relationships rather than
actual events-as a persuasive tool for lawyers).
6. E.g., Thomas Baker & Eva Orlebeke, The Application of Per-Occurrence Limits From
Successive Policies, 3 ENvrL. CLAIMS J. 411, 412-19 (1991) (using statements by insurance industry
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too--as they should. It is through these stories that insurance companies
tell people what o expect from insurance, insurance companies, and insur-
ance claims! Examining these stories, and the competing visions of
insurance that they project, can help judges decipher the unwritten obliga-
tions of the insurance relationship. Moreover, analyzing the way judges
use the stories can serve another, equally important purpose, that of
understanding the doctrinal lines drawn in insurance cases.
Insurance companies tell two different sets of stories about insurance
at two distinct points in the insurance relationship. When marketing their
services, insurance companies tell what I will call "sales stories." This
first set of stories, drawn from insurance advertising, responds to the fears
of dependency that are epitomized by King Lear. When handling claims,
insurance companies tell a second set of stories, which I will call "claims
stories." This second set of stories, drawn from fieldwork with adjusters
and from insurance adjustment rade literature, stresses the need to protect
the insurance fund from overreaching, as dramatized (perhaps overdrama-
tized) by King Richard III. These two sets of stories evoke quite different
visions of the insurance relationship. The continuing trouble of the courts
in defining the obligations of the insurance relationship stems in part from
this duality, which is also apparent in judicial opinions.' In the abstract
at least, both visions are equally "right" (and just as equally "wrong").
spokesmen and records of insurance policy drafting sessions as "stories" in arguing for horizontal
"stacking" in continuous injury cases under a standard form comprehensivegeneral liability policy).
7. See, e.g., Irionv. Prudential Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 337, 338 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1991) ("[T]his
case can be summed up as follows: Plaintiff, at the inducement of Prudential, got herself a 'piece of
the rock,' and now that it's time for the insurance company to pay, Prudential wants to take its rocks
and go home."), rev'd 964 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1992); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nicholson,
777 P.2d 1152, 1156 n.6 (Alaska 1989) ("It is noteworthy that the insurance company involved in this
appeal promotes itself in national advertisements with the slogan, 'Like a good neighbor, State Farm
is there.'"); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1978) ("The insurer's promise to the insured to 'simplify his life,' to put him 'in good hands,' to
back him with 'a piece of the rock' or to be 'on his side' hardly suggests that the insurer will abandon
the insured in his time of need."), aff'd, 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981); see also Marshal S. Shapo,
Advertising and the Liability qf Product Sellers (pt. 2), 8 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 477, 477 (Sept. 22,
1993) (describing how judges and lawyers use manufacturers' "image" advertising as a source of legal
obligation in products liability cases). Of course, judges sometimes decide not to impose such
obligations. E.g., Rodio v. Smith, 587 A.2d 621, 624 (N.J. 1991) ("However persuasive, 'You're in
good hands with Allstate' is nothing more than puffery.").
8. See Robert H. Jerry, I, Remedying Insurers' Bad Faith ContractPerformance: A Reassessment,
18 CONN. L. REV. 271, 299, 298-99 (1986) (arguing that insurers "often emphasize" the effects of
casualties and the "peace of mind" that insurance provides when "attempting to convincethe consumer
to purchase insurance"); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INsURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCiPLEs, LEGAL DOCTINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 6.3, 635 & n.25
(student ed. 1988) ("[T]here are circumstances in which an insured's reasonable expectations may
result from the conduct of the insurance industry as a whole. As for example, by similar
advertisements of several insurance companies.").
9. See infra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
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Yet, the choice of lens can determine whether the insured in a particular
case is seen as poor King Lear or wicked King Richard.
This conception of legal institutions as mediating between incompatible
narratives that are both (or all) "true" is a profound, but by no means new,
insight.1" Identifying the sales and claims stories and their conflicting
visions of the insurance relationship may help us understand the dynamics
of insurance coverage litigation, but is unlikely to answer the hardest
question: when to use which vision. Nevertheless, as I hope this Paper
demonstrates, the exercise has more than mere academic interest.
We should consider this ource of insight into the nature of the insur-
ance relationship because the traditional sources-the standard form insur-
ance policy, statutory and administrative provisions, and even modem
insurance law doctrine-have not been enough. As the various approaches
taken by contributors to this Symposium demonstrate, the traditional
sources have not answered satisfactorily the remedies questions posed by
insurance coverage cases: (1) when and why insureds who prevail in insur-
ance coverage litigation should receive as compensation the "three-quarter
loaf" that "normal" contract damages doctrine supplies; (2) when and why
insureds should be fully compensated" for an insurance company's failure
to pay or defend a claim; and (3) when and why insurance companies
should pay damages even beyond that amount (viz., punitive damages).
At present, most courts draw the line between (1) and (2)-between
classical contract damages and complete compensation-by looking at the
intent of the insurance company.2 If the insurance company denied the
claim in "good faith," the insured gets the three-quarter loaf; only if the
insurance company denied the claim in "bad faith" does the insured get
complete compensation (and in some cases not even then).3 In this
10. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983) ("Law may be viewed as a system oftension or a bridge linking a concept
of a reality to an imagined alternative--that is, as a connective between two states of affairs, both of
which can be represented in their normative significance only through the devices of narrative."); Nomi
M. Stolzenberg, 'He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out 7.Assimilaion, Indoctrination. and the Paradox
of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582, 584 (1993) (addressing the paradox of liberal law's
"tolerance for the intolerant" and the irreconcilable nature of liberal and fundamentalist claims on
public education).
11. Full compensation includes attorneys' fees and compensation for emotional distress and other
harms thought to run afoul of traditional contract doctrine. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8
n.3 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that a party injured by breach of contract "generally cannot recover costs of
litigation"); id. § 12.17 (acknowledging a general rule denying recovery for mental distress resulting
from breach of contract).
12. See Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions:
Refining the Standard of Culpability ad Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 1, 33-40 (1992) (surveying jurisdictions that recognize the tort of bad faith breach and describing
the different standards of intent that trigger the tort).
13. See id. at 2-3 (noting that in bad faith cases insurers are exposed to damages beyond the
traditional contract measures, including consequential damages for economic losses, emotional distress,
and punitive damages).
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Paper, I use the stories insurance companies tell to suggest why courts
draw this intent-based line and also to question the damage rules typically
applied on either side of that line. In the process, I provide one answer to
at least the "when" portions of questions (1) and (2) above and one answer
to both the when and why of question (3). I conclude that courts should
award complete compensatory damages in the ordinary insurance coverage
ease and that some award beyond that amount is called for in the true "bad
faith" case, as punishment for the intentional betrayal of the trust without
which the insurance relationship cannot exist.
One could certainly reach the same doctrinal conclusions without
paying attention to the stories that insurance companies and judges tell.
Nevertheless, these stories help answer an important question that a con-
tracts professor or appellate judge is sure to raise: "What is it about
insurance that justifies this 'special' rule?" Or, put differently, "How can
you limit the application of these arguments so that you are not calling for
a revision of contract damages doctrine generally?"
My approach to insurance contract damages is so deeply grounded
within the insurance stories that it should not threaten whatever goals are
achieved by maintaining the three-quarter loaf rule for contract damages
generally. Although the damages rule that I advocate is likely to have
broader application beyond insurance cases, I make no such claim here,
and my sources-the insurance stories-provide no basis for that claim.
Extending this rule beyond insurance would require detailed analysis of
other contractual relationships and a demonstration that those relationships
involve comparable vulnerability and need. The stories that banks tell
about banking, that automobile companies tell about cars, or that brokerage
houses tell about securities, may help define the obligations that inhere in
banking, automotive, or brokerage relationships, but the stories that insur-
ance companies tell about insurance do not address those relationships.14
14. My knowledge of these other commercial relationships is much less extensive than my
knowledge of the insurance relationship. Furthermore, my method in this Paper does not require me
to set forth the explanation that follows within this note. But because enough people have asked for
a definitive statement of the "difference" between the insurance relationship and these other commercial
relationships, I will explain what I think may be the differences between insurance and at least some
other "bureaucratic goods" marketed using similar advertisements. See Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy
and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5, 17, 14-17 (1984) (explaining that a
"bureaucratic good"-a good with a bureaucratic function-is a good which affects the actions of
consumers). Those differences may be (1) the extreme nature of the "dependency dynamic," a dynamic
which, as I explain in Part I, is marked both by a long delay between payment and performance and
by a great disparity between the payment and the value of the performance; (2) the historical evolution
of the insurance function that is sketched at infra note 62 and accompanying text; and (3) the tight link
between current and future beneficiaries of the insurance contract which supports the idea, asserted in
Part III, that the insured who prevails in an insurance coverage case will increase the value of the
insurance company's promise to all of its insureds. My purpose in this Paper is not to explain what
is unique about the insurance relationship, but rather to study that relationship by, among other things,
closely examining the stories that insurance companies tell about what it is that they are selling.
1994] 1399
Texas Law Review
Part I of this Paper presents the insurance stories. In the first set of
stories-the sales stories-insurance companies promise complete protection
from the risks addressed by any given line of insurance. In the second set
of stories-the claims stories-insurance companies explain why it is that
"complete protection" sometimes amounts to a little less; why it is, in
other words, that some risks are not shifted to the insurance company.
Part II shows that judges already use the insurance stories in judicial
opinions. What I call the "insurance as contract" claims story is clearly
the baseline, but judges use the sales stories too. The judicial versions of
the sales stories appear in two sets of cases: those that use doctrines
establishing rights "at variance with," to use Robert Keeton's formula-
tion,"5 or supplemental to, standard form insurance policy provisions; and
those that punish insurance companies for acting in bad faith.
Part I analyzes the damages available in the ordinary insurance case
through the lens of the insurance stories. Both the sales stories' promise
of complete protection and the claims stories' explanation of the limits of
that promise call for complete compensation i the ordinary insurance case.
The sales story side of this equation focuses on the real promise of the
insurance relationship, the promise to "be there" in a time of great vulner-
ability and need. The claims story side focuses on the overriding theme of
insurance as a public trust. Just as the insurance company acts on behalf
of the public trust when it denies an illegitimate claim, insureds, too, act
on behalf of that-trist when they press the insurance company to expand
its recognition of what is a covered claim. Good faith late payments are
a necessary result of determining insurance companies' obligations under
their contracts, and the harm insureds suffer as a result of those late
payments is part of the cost of determining those obligations. That cost is
appropriately borne by insurance companies, who, as the claims stories
emphasize, stand in the shoes of the future beneficiaries of those contracts.
In concluding, I express some support for punishing the betrayal that
the bad faith case represents. I also stress, however, that providing
complete compensatory damages in the ordinary insurance case should
reduce the importance of the resulting punitive damages line in most
insurance coverage litigation.
I. Insurance Stories
I will begin with a highly compressed (and admittedly functionalist)
restatement of some basic aspects of insurance that underlie the Lear and
Richard tensions in the insurance relationship: Insurance is a means by
15. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV.
L. RBv. 961, 961 (1970) (explaining the reasons for the variance in insurance law between policy
provisions and policyholders' rights).
1400 [Vol. 72:1395
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which individuals and organizations share the risk of misfortune. We each
pay a little (sometimes not so little) so that there will be money to pay for
the losses of the unfortunate few. This arrangement involves the exchange
of money for a promise, the promise to be paid in the future in the event
of a loss. Specialized organizations-usually insurance companies-fill this
function, collecting premiums, holding the funds for the benefit of insur-
eds, and paying claims. These organizations strive to make money in this
process by collecting more money in premiums than they pay out and by
investing the money during the lag time between collection and payout.
Because of the importance of insurance companies' claims-paying function,
there is an elaborate insurance industry and governmental apparatus for
ensuring that insurance companies have enough money to pay (and do pay)
those who are entitled to be paid. The major role that the courts play in
this apparatus is to enforce insurance companies' promises (including, of
course, defining the scope of these promises).
There are inescapable tensions in the relationship between insurance
companies and their insureds. Consider first the tension within the money-
for-promise arrangement. All that an insurance company has to sell is its
promise to pay. Yet, all other things being equal, the better an insurance
company is at avoiding that promise, the more money it makes.16 The
power that the money-for-promise arrangement gives an insurance company
after a loss and the opportunity an insurer has to use that power are best
illustrated by an example:
Some time ago, you bought a disability insurance policy from
Good Friend Insurance Company. As you understand the policy,
Good Friend will pay you seventy-five percent of your annual
income if you are unable to practice your profession because of a
disability. Since then, you have paid your premiums regularly.
Last week, you learned that you had a progressive illness that
could result in the permanent loss of your vision over the next year
or so. The doctor told you about a clinic in San Francisco that has,
on an experimental basis, treated other people with your condition,
using a treatment that akes a year to complete and requires you to
be in San Franciseo the entire time. The clinic estimates a fifty
percent chance of retaining a functional amount of vision if you
begin the treatment immediately.
16. This too-neatformulation obscures other important ways insurance companies trive to increase
their profits. The first and most obvious way is by developing new insurance services, packages, and
marketing plans to increase the amount of insurance premiums that the company collects. A second,
less obvious way is by identifying people who are unlikely to make a claim, thereby reducing the
likelihood of having to make good on the promise to pay. The existence of these other ways to
improve profits does not, however, eliminate the incentive to withhold or delay payment at the time
of claim.
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When you called your disability insurer to make arrangements
for payments during the time that you would be unable to work
because of the treatment, the claims representative demurred. She
explained that, according to the policy, the disability payments would
not begin until you were unable to work because of an actual
disability. Because you proposed to stop working so that you could
obtain a treatment (and an unproven one at that) that may prevent a
potential disability, you were not yet entitled to any payments.
What do you do? You cannot shop around for a new disability
policy, and going to court will not get you the money in time for the
treatment in San Francisco.
As this hypothetical illustrates, the insurance relationship is a relationship
of dependence. Before deciding which insurance company to choose, you
are a free agent; once you have a claim, you depend on the company you
chose to honor its promise. This dependence and the incentives it creates
are what make King Lear a potential protagonist in any insurance case.
Consider next he tension between the insurance company's role as
trustee of the insurance "trust fund" and its role as protector of individual
insureds. Payment is almost always in the interest of individuals who have
suffered losses, but in the aggregate those losses may overwhelm the
insurance trust fund. The insurer insolvencies following Hurricane Andrew
provide a ready example.17 An insurance company that is too free with
the fund today may jeopardize the future well-being of other insureds who
have relied on its promise, while an insurance company that holds on to
that fund too tightly devalues the worth of its promise to those others.
Thus, the insurance relationship is also a relationship of balance in which
the insurance company mediates between those currently in need and those
who may be in need in the future.
Consider finally the tension inherent in any situation in which one
person's losses are covered by another.8 Because it is the insurance
17. See TOM GALLAGHER, FLORIDA DEP'T OF INS., HURRICANE ANDREW'S IMPACT ON
INSURANCE IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA 22 (1993) ("Andrew directly caused six insurer insolvencies,
affecting an estimated 88,000 policyholders.").
18. The term "moral hazard" is sometimes used in connection with this tension. Although moral
hazard as defined in economic theory is an interesting and sometimes useful concept, I avoid using the
term except when referring to economic literature. The problem with the term is twofold. First, the
overtones of the label moral hazard are troubling, given the structural nature of the phenomenon
economists use it to describe. See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 531, 531 (1968) ("[T]he problem of 'moral hazard' in insurance has, in fact, little to do with
morality, but can be analyzed with orthodox economic tools."); cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and
the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 942 (1963) (discussing the
normative aspects of the label "optimality theorem" and introducing the term "moral hazard" into
neoclassical economic discourse). Second, the economists' definition of moral hazard does not map
the use of the term in the insurance literature or in judicial opinions. Compare Steven Shavel, On
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company that pays, an insured who could prevent or minimize a loss may
not do so: the owner of a run-down building may prefer that it burn down;
the owner of a house ravaged by a hurricane may be indifferent to what a
contractor charges to rebuild. In some circumstances, this reduced incen-
tive to exercise care can lead to outright fraud: arson in the first instance,
kickbacks in the second. Thus, the insurance relationship includes the
possibility of exploitation by insureds. It is this possibility and the
resulting need to limit the individual's claim against the collective resources
that make King Richard a potential protagonist in any insurance case.
Not surprisingly, insurance companies stress different aspects of the
insurance relationship in different contexts. When selling insurance,
companies address the dependent nature of the relationship, palliating the
fears that dependency arouses in prospective insureds. When paying
claims, on the other hand, insurance companies stress the need to balance
and limit overreaching. These sales and claims stories "work" in their
place because each corresponds to core aspects of insurance. But because
the two sets of stories stress different core aspects, their visions of the
insurance relationship conflict.
A. Sales Stories: Trusting the Insurance Relationship
Most people can recite a few of the more salient insurance advertising
slogans. Examples include: "You're in good hands with Allstate"; 9
Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECONOMICS 541, 541 (1979) ("Moral hazard refers ... to the
tendency of insurance protection to alter an individual's motive to prevent loss.") with Pedersen v. Life
of Mid-Am. Ins. Co., 164 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1969) ("'Moral hazard' means any personal habit
or activity of the insured that would cause him to be something less than a standard risk for
insurance.") and EDWIN J. FAULKNER, HEALTH INSURANCE 327 (1960) ("Moral hazard reflects the
hazard that arises from the failure of individuals who are or have been affected by a contract of
insurance to uphold the accepted moral qualities.") and CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND
RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 29 (1985) ("[In insurance
literature,I [mloral hazard is generally taken to be a character trait existing prior to insurance coverage
. .. .") and JOHN D. LONG, ETHICS, MORALITY AND INSURANCE: A LONG-RANOE OUTLOOK 40-45
(1971) (equating the concept of moral hazard with the risk of unethical behavior by the insured) and
G.F. MICHEILBACHER, MULTIPLE-LINEINSURANCE220 (1957) ("Moral hazard is every deviation from
correct human behavior that may pose a problem for an insurer."). Thus, the use of the term "moral
hazard" in insurance law is ripe for further study. See Tom Baker, The Genealogy of Moral Hazard
(Oct. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (describing the adoption of
the "moral hazard" concept beyond the field of insurance into the larger context of the rhetoric of
economics in law).
19. See NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 1993, at 6 (advertisement for Allstate Insurance). [The print
advertisements cited by Professor Baker in this Paper were verified to the extent possible using
magazines available through the various libraries at The University of Texas at Austin. However,
modem technology has allowed a number of niagazine publishers to distribute regional editions, each
containing different advertisements specifically selected for the regional markets. A researcher in a
different region, therefore, may be unable to find a particular advertisement using the citation appearing
in this Paper. The Texas Law Review will maintain a file of all print advertisements cited in this
Paper.-Eds.l.
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"Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there";' "Nationwide is on your
side";21 "A piece of the rock"; ' and my favorite, "Get Met. It
pays."' That we can recall these slogans so easily is no surprise. The
insurance industry, and these companies in particular, are among the
largest volume advertisers in the United States.'
What is so interesting about these slogans, and about insurance adver-
tising generally, is how directly they address the dependency dynamic in
the insurance relationship. A recent magazine advertising campaign for life
insurance with the theme of "Promises" is particularly illustrative. On the
left page of each two-page spread is a beautiful, informal picture of a man
or woman with children. The right page is mostly white space, with three
lines of text in the middle of the page and two smaller lines of text at the
bottom with the company logo and registered slogan, "We help you keep
your promises." '
Throughout the series, the three lines of text opposite the picture each
begin with the words "A promise." Here is a representative example that
appears opposite a picture of (presumably) a father with his three little
boys:
A promise never to say, "Chris, I mean Bobby, I mean Tim."
A promise matching sailor suits will never come near your closet.
A promise to be there for you. And you. And you.'
In each ad, the text at the bottom of the page reads:
Nothing binds us one to the other like a promise kept. Nothing
divides us like a promise broken. At MassMutual we believe in
keeping our promises. That way all the families and businesses that-
rely on us can keep theirs.27
No approach could be more direct: You need insurance because of the
promises you have made in life. You should buy that insurance from us
20. See PARENTS, Sept. 1994, at 60 (advertisement for State Farm Insurance Company).
21. See S. LIVING, July 1994, at 6 (advertisement for Nationwide Insurance).
22. See Bus. WK., June 17, 1972, at 107 (advertisement for Prudential Insurance Company).
23. See NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1994, at 34-35 (advertisement for Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company).
24. See Kate Fitzgerald, A New Policy: Life Insurers Tout Strength Amid Bad Press, ADVERTISING
AGE, Sept. 2, 1991, at 3 (describing the large advertising budgets of the major insurance companies);
JoeMandese, Top TVAdvertisers Beef Up Spending, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 11. 1991, at 4 (reporting
that the top 10 network television advertisers increased spending 14% from 1989 to 1990); Top 100
Entry Price: $104 Million in Ads, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 26, 1990, at 61 (Chart: Top 25 Network
Radio Advertisers) (ranking State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance as the twenty-second highest national
spender in network radio advertising for 1989).
25. E.g., FAMILY FUN, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 4-5 (advertisement for Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Company).
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
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because "we believe in keeping our promises."' How good is our prom-
ise? As good as the promise that an ideal parent makes to a child. The
insurance relationship may place you (or your family or business) in a
dependent position, but there are other relationships of dependency in life
that work out, and this one will too.
Many other advertising campaigns tell a similar story of trust and
dependence. Allstate Life Insurance Company's "good hands" campaign,
which builds on powerful images of God and father, is one.29 Others
include Travelers Insurance Company's "taking care of one another" cam-
paign,' State Farm's "good neighbor" campaign,3 1 Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company's "on your side" campaign,32 and Cigna Property and
Casualty Insurance Company's new "a business of caring" campaign?
A recent State Farm Life Insurance Company print campaign targeted at
mothers is particularly direct. Superimposed over a picture of a mother
holding her daughter, the advertising copy tells a story about a State Farm
agent who is also a mother. The copy concludes, "So when it comes to
life there are two things you can always count on. A mother's love and
your State Farm agent."'4 What do our images of good neighbors, moth-
ers, fathers, and God have in common? Much more than simply having
been pressed into service by Madison Avenue on behalf of the insurance
industry.
Other insurance advertising campaigns address the theme of depen-
dency and keeping promises indirectly. One group of advertisements touts
insurance companies' financial stability and, thus, their ability to keep
promises. The Prudential Insurance Company of America's "rock" symbol
is perhaps the most recognizable example of the financial stability
advertisement: "In a changing world, one thing remains rock solid."35
Prudential recently began making the point even more directly, promising
that "Peace of mind... comes with every piece of the rock."'
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1993, at 9 (advertisement).
30. See, e.g., FoRBES, July 19, 1993, at 179 (advertisement); see also, e.g., Bus. INS., Sept. 6,
1993, at 9 (advertisement for Travelers Insurance Company) ("With 129 years in the insurance
business, we know about lasting relationships.").
31. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 60 (advertisement). Farmers Insurance Group
combines the familiar images of retirees playing golf and hard-working farmers to convey its message
that it is a "company you can trust." See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, July 26, 1993, at 26-27 (advertisement)
("Up at dawn, out fill last light. It's a Farmers Life.").
32. See, e.g., TIME, July 25, 1994, at 70 (advertisement) ("Nationwide is on your side.").
33. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 5 (advertisement).
34. E.g., PARENTS, June 1993, at 121 (advertisement).
35. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 1992, at 16-17 (advertisement).
36. E.g., Elizabeth Jensen, Ad Notes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1993, at B7 (describing Prudential's
"peace of mind" television campaign). For other examples, see FoRBES, July 19, 1993, at 111
(advertisement for American Family Life Assurance Company) (employing the slogan "safest insurance
19941 1405
Texas Law Review
A second group of indirect campaigns stresses the company's commit-
ment to traditional values, the link to the golden past when people could
be trusted. One such campaign comes from the Cincinnati Insurance
Companies: "Quality ... it still holds meaning for us."37 Another
campaign comes from Wausau, whose "Wausau Story" may be the longest
running example of this type of advertising campaign. As Wausau's
former advertising director explains, the Wausau Story "draw[s] heavily
upon the attributes of our home town, steeped in Midwestern values and
small town friendliness."38 A more recent example comes from a Mutual
of America print ad with the heading "Our Commitment" and the follow-
ing text:
The Spirit of America. It's determination and dedication. It's
people and principle. It's savvy. And it's sensitivity. The Spirit of
America.
We share it as a company and a country. A commitment to our
policyholders' futures. The Spirit of America.39
Like the ads addressing insureds' dependence, this "values" advertising
lays claim to a world beyond self-interest, a community in which people
take care of each other without regard to the precise contribution each has
made.
A final group of advertising campaigns plays on the images contained
in rival advertising. "[L]eadership," says Unum Corporation, "is more
than just providing a handful of policies and a promise to be there."'
Leadership is "tailoring coverage to fit people's lives... [and] making
sure every conceivable aspect of a disability plan is taken care of."41
Mutual of Omaha takes a similar approach with the theme "Protecting you
in ways no one ever thought of before."42 Instead of ideal parents or
good neighbors, these advertisements feature wise professionals. But the
message is still the same: You can .depend on us.
company in America"); FoRBEs, Sept. 28, 1992, at 81 (advertisement for ITT Hartford Group, Inc.)
("In these uncertain times, policyholders and investors seek financial strength and stability."); J. AM.
Soc'y CLU & CHFC, Nov. 1993, at 13 (advertisement for Mutual Life Insurance Company of New
York) ("[Flor 150 years, we've been helping people keep their futures secure."); NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31,
1994, at 34-35 (advertisement for Metropolitan Life Insurance Company) ("Our financial strength is
legendary.'); NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 1993, at 68-69 (advertisement for Transamerica Corporation) ("The
power of the pyramid is working for you.").
37. E.g., TIME. Mar. 29. 1993, at 66 (advertisement).
38. ROBERT W. GUNDERSON, THE WAUSAU STORY 193 (1992).
39. E.g., TIME, July 19, 1993, at 55 (advertisement).
40. E.g., SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 12, 1993, at 55 (advertisement).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1992, at 145 (advertisement).
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It is easy to parody insurance advertising and to belittle the promise
"to be there." After all, insurance companies are not mothers, fathers,
neighbors, teammates, heroes, demigods, rocks, pyramids, repositories of
traditional values, or any of the myriad of other images that Madison
Avenue employs. Yet, there is something to the story that Madison Ave-
nue tells. Insurance is the real safety net for middle America.' When
Hurricane Andrew hit southern Florida in 1992," when the winter storm
of 1993 blanketed the East Coast,4' and when the fires roared through
Malibu in the fall of 1993, insurance companies for the most part did
take care of their policyholders. Children are educated with the proceeds
of life insurance; paraplegics are rehabilitated with the assistance of health
and disability insurance; businesses are saved by liability insurance. "A
world beyond self-interest" may be an exaggeration, but there is no deny-
ing that these examples are remarkable achievements of people taking care
of one another. In no small measure, insurance companies often deserve
the trust that is placed in them.
B. Claims Stories: Limiting the Insurance Relationship
If the sales stories stress the trust without which the insurance
relationship could not exist, the claims stories emphasize the limits of that
relationship. The claims stories enable those handling insurance claims to
say "no" to the insurance claimant, and they also enable claimants to
accept that "no" without losing the trust in the insurance company that the
sales stories attempt to foster.47
43. As a result, of course, a great many people. especially the poor, are left out. See Tom Baker
& Karen McElrath, Inequality and the Private Safety Net: The Home Insurance Example (Oct. 1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review) (concluding that disasters increase
inequality because members of historically disadvantaged groups purchase less insurance than the
comparatively advantaged).
44. See GALLAGHER, supra note 17, at 4-5 (1993) (describing insurance adjusters' efforts to reach
insureds and to process their claims expeditiously).
45. See John N. Maclean, Insurers' Quake, Cold Costs Rise, CHI. TRiB., Feb. 4, 1994, at Bus.
1, available in Westlaw, CHITRIB database (discussing the economic ramifications on insurers of the
Eastern freeze of 1993); Bill Montague, Disasters Slam Insurance Firms, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1994,
at BI, available in Westlaw, USATDY database (pointing out that, although the winter storms were
"a financial catastrophe for the insurance industry," all proper claims were being paid); Dee DePass,
Quake, Storms to Cost the St. Paul, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 11, 1994, at D3, available
in Westlaw, STARTRIB database (observing that, while the eastern storms were costing the insurance
industry a great amount, it was financially secure).
46. See Judith Schroer, Calm in a Firestorm: Insurance Adjusters Bring Relief USA TODAY, Nov.
10, 1993, at BI, available in Westlaw, USATDY database (reporting that insurance companies opened
temporary disaster offices to deal with their insureds' claims as the fires continued to burn).
47. Cf. Benjamin Horton, Column XX VI-Let It Be Fun, INS. ADJUsTER, May 1971, at 10
(explaining that in a "no coverage" situation, the goal of the insurance adjuster is the "handling of this
demand or request . . . so effectively that [the] insured voluntarily withdraws [the] claim while
maintaining complete good will and respect for both company and adjuster").
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Advertisements touting insurance companies' reliability, responsibility,
and concern are everywhere. In contrast, insurance companies rarely
advertise their limits. They do, however, need to teach their limiting
stories to industry newcomers. Thus, insurance trade journals and text-
books are ready sources of these stories. Another helpful source is field
research conducted with insurance adjusters, such as Ross's study of
automobile accident claims48 and my ongoing study of Hurricane Andrew
property damage claims.49
Somewhat arbitrarily (and certainly preliminarily), I have grouped
these claims stories into three overlapping sets. The first set stresses the
contractual nature of insurance and the insurance company's responsibility
to define (and enforce) who and what- is encompassed within the protection
offered by the contract. The second set emphasizes the responsibility of
the insurance company to future claimants: because the insurance company
has to be there for people tomorrow, it must limit claims today. The third
set highlights the corrupting potential of insurance and the responsibility of
the company in rooting out that corruption: because insureds do not risk
their own money, those who make claims are irresponsible and often
fraudulent. The unifying image that weaves through all of these claims
stories is the insurance company as the guardian of the public trust.
1. Insurance as Contract: The Responsibility to Define and Enforce
Limits.-The insurance-as-contract laims story is a deceptively simple one.
It says that, despite what policyholders might think, insurance is not just
some "thing" one buys. Rather, insurance is a contract between an insur-
ance company and its policyholder, and the terms of that contract are
spelled out in the standard-form insurance policies and supplemented, when
necessary, with the standard operating procedures of the insurance com-
pany. Insurance is complicated because the forms are long and difficult to
understand; but insurance is also clear once you learn the forms. While
there are gray areas like valuing property damage and determining its
cause, the insurance contract i self is black and white.'
48. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT (1970) (analyzing the results of a study in which the author interviewed 67
insurance adjusters and observed them in claims negotiations).
49. Following Hurricane Andrew, I began interviewing claimants and insurance adjusters and
observing insurance claim mediations as part of an effort to understand insurance law in action. As
a condition of all the interviews, I agreed to maintain the confidentiality of the subjects.
50. It is important to distinguish between the insurance-as-contract laims story, on the one hand,
and both the "law on the books" and the "law in action," on the other. The insurance law applied by
the appellate courts-the "law on the books"-differs significantly from that of the insurance law of
the insurance-as-contract claims story. See infra Part I. Perhaps less obviously, the contract law
applied by adjuters-the "law in action"-also differs from that of the insurance-as-contract claims
story. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGiC OF PRACTICE 103 (Richard Nice trans., 1990) ("[T]he rule
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The job of the adjuster is to apply the contract to the claim. As
Benjamin Horton, former president of the National Adjuster Training
School, wrote,
[T]he adjuster did not prepare the contract and should only think in
terms of interpreting and implementing it. He should have no desire
to either expand or reduce the promises of the company. The
primary goal of the claimsman in first party situations should be to
assist he insured in submitting a proper claim according to the terms
of the policy. It is the function of the underwriters to determine the
coverage to be afforded. The adjuster works with the contract which
was provided rather than that which he believes should have been in
existence.5
This story teaches adjusters that insureds typically are not familiar
with the precise terms of the insurance policy, and may not even realize
that insurance involves a contract between the insured and the insurance
company. Thus, confusion and resistance to the concept are to be ex-
pected:
What then causes the problems? The problems and the causes
are age old. Probably the basic cause, at least as far as a claimant
is concerned, is lack of knowledge of what he or she is covered for
-.. is the obstacle par excellence to the construction of an adequate theory of practice."). While it
is very difficult to describe with any rigor the "law in action" of the insurance adjuster, that law is far
less mechanical than the claims story would suggest. Adjusters have significant discretion to deviate
from, and in fact do deviate from, the formal rules that nominally govern them. This discretion is
similar to that of "street-level bureaucrats." public service workers who interact directly with citizens.
See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEvEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDMDUAL IN PUBLIC
SERViCES 13 (1980) (describing the ability of policemen, judges, teachers, and prison guards, among
other professionals, to exercise "considerable discretion in determining the nature, amount, and quality
of benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies"). For example, one adjuster told me that he
deviated from company policy disallowing claims if it made economic sense to pay the claims. He
said: "[If] I have a $500 claim for something that's not covered, I'm going to pay it to avoid the $IOOO
legal expense." Interview with anonymous independent adjuster, at the Florida Department of
Insurance Mediation Center, Homestead, Fla. (July 22, 1993) (on file with author); see also Ross,
supra note 48, at 204-09 (reporting in a study of the automobile insurance industry that adjusters
frequently pay small but invalid claims despite the company's official policy not to do so); William C.
Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 Wis.
L. REV. 83, 141 (reporting that, as a practical matter, automobile manufacturers' products liability
claims were handled on a strict liability basis even before the rise of strict liability in consumer
protection law).
51. Benjamin Horton, Human Relations?, INS. ADJUSTER, Dec. 1970, at 12 [hereinafter Horton,
Human Relations?]; see also Ben Horton, Has the 7hrust Changed?, INS. ADJUSTER, Oct. 1971, at 10,
10 ("This idea involves a careful study of the policy and any and all forms and endorsements with the
end in mind that the adjuster is better informed than any other single person concerning the contents
of the contract."); Benjamin Horton, Coverage Under Property Policies, INS. ADJUSTER, Mar. 1970,
at 8, 36 ("It is necessary on every assignment that the decision be made-whether consciously realized
or not-as to whether or not coverage for the particular loss is provided for by the individual contract
under which [the] claim is filed.").
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or entitled to when they suffer a loss. It is very rare to find a
policyholder in a first party loss situation that knows what he policy
covers them for. It is equally as rare to find one that has read the
policy. Actually the policy is a contract and the insured should be
aware of the terms of the contract. Many insureds will make the
outright statement that they don't need to understand the
contract-that's why they have an agent.5'
The job of the adjuster, then, is not only to adjust the loss, but also to
educate the insured about the nature of insurance and the limits of the
contract:
I tell them that if we covered every conceivable risk, premiums
would be sky high, so we have to except certain things. No
insurance company in the world covers everything. Then I show
them where in the contract it says what the company will and won't
pay for.
53
First and foremost, the job of the adjuster is to enforce the contract.
Those insureds who persist in the face of the adjuster's efforts at education
are to be vigorously resisted. "Millions for defense," the slogan goes,
"but not one cent for tribute."'
2. The Responsibility to Future Claimants.-In explaining the denial
of claims, insurance adjusters confront the reality that the insurance
company keeps the money that the claimant wants. All the claims stories
address this aspect of the tension in the money-for-promise arrangement,
but none so directly as those that emphasize the insurance company's
responsibility to future claimants.
The extreme form of this story asserts that wrongly paid claims threat-
en the very existence of insurance. One adjuster explained how he would
respond to a claimant who challenged a denial of coverage:
52. Albert Conte, INS. ADJusTER, Aug. 1974, at 40 (letter to the editor); see also Robert Kopta,
Just Reflecting, INs. ADJUSTER, Dec. 1974, at 5 ("Those who work in the claims field are acutely
aware of the lack of knowledge of the average consumerwith respect to even the basics of insurance.").
53. Interview with anonymous in-house adjuster, at the Florida Department of Insurance Mediation
Center, Homestead, Fla. (July 1, 1993) (on file with author); see also Horton, Human Relations?,
supra note 51, at 13 (describing the clash between the "cold blooded terminology" of the insurance
policy and the expectations of the policyholder, who "probably was not previously aware of the fact
that an insurance contract, just like all others, places obligations on both parties").
54. Robert G. Harper, Toast at Banquet for John Marshall (June 18, 1878), in FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONs416 (Emily M. Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980); cf. Richard L. Neumeier, Serving Two Masters:
Problems Facing Insurance Defense Counsel and Some Proposed Solutions, 77 MASS. L. REV. 66, 79
(1992) (noting that ethics rules and case law do not provide "that an insured or defense counsel may
demand that the insurer spend millions for defense but not a penny for tribute"). An independent
adjuster put it as follows: "Millions for defense, not one penny we don't owe." Interview with
anonymous independent adjuster, in Coral Gables, Fla. (June 8, 1993) (on file with author).
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[F]ortunately, most insurance companies are solvent-and I'm sure
you'll agree that that's the way we want to keep them. The only way
we can do this is to provide for fair and equitable payment of all
losses and claims. If a company overpays its losses, it will fail. I'm
sure you wouldn't appreciate having a loss or claim that couldn't be
paid because the company had gone broke, would you?55
An insurance company president provided a similar explanation in an ad-
dress to adjusters, stating that the adjuster's role is to
explain that we are in the business to pay claims, but that this
business can survive only so long as those payments are fair,
reasonable, and just. That attempts to exaggerate or inflate claims
can lead only to higher insurance costs or the ultimate collapse of
this man-made system.
56
A more common version of the story highlights the less dramatic link
between claims payments and insurance premiums. For example, as I
noted in describing the educational role of the adjuster, one in-house
adjuster explained how she responds to insureds who assert that they should
be paid for an excluded loss: "I tell them that if we covered every con-
ceivable risk, premiums would be sky high, so we have to except certain
things."57 Both versions of the "responsibility to other claimants" story
nicely obscure the insurance company that keeps the money and highlight
instead a public that wants affordable insurance. The "fine print" of the
insurance "contract" protects not the insurance company, but the premium-
paying public.
3. The Immoral Insured.-
IT]he normally decent, law-abiding American ... , if left to his
own devices, "has a little larceny in his soul."58
55. Winning Replies: Policyholders' Complaints Answeredat Chicago, INS. ADJUSTER, May 1970,
at 38 [hereinafter Winning Replies] (quoting an award-winning response to a typical policyholder
complaint about high premiums).
56. Tom O'Day, Just Reflecting, INS. ADJUSTER, June 1969, at 5 (quoting Howard A. Baker,
Address at the National Association of Independent Insurance Adjusters Annual Convention (May
1969)).
57. Interview with anonymous in-house adjuster, supra note 53. As my use of this same statement
in describing the insurance-as-contractclaims story should make clear, the claims stories are interrelated
and overlapping. For another story demonstrating the link between claims and premiums, see Winning
Replies, supra note 55, at 38 ("Handling an excluded loss is always unpleasant, but I'm sure you
understand that a policy, like any business contract, has to have some limitations. Otherwise, the
premium would be prohibitive." (quoting an award-winning response to a typical policyholder
complaint about high premiums)).
58. Tom O'Day, Just Reflecting, INS. ADJUSTER, Apr. 1969, at 5 (quoting George M. Lynch, Jr.,
Address at the Mutual Loss Managers' Conference (1969)).
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And really, people can't see it as anybody's money. The insurance
company and the federal government-people like that-they are fair
game where the public is concerned.5 9
The story of the immoral insured teaches that the role of the "adjuster
at the loss" is that of the "'cop on the corer'... [,] the best deterrent to
overpayment." ' Or, to put it even more succinctly, "It's a dirty job, but
somebody has to keep them honest."61 The story of the immoral insured
complements the stories that stress the insurance company's responsibility
to future claimants. Insurance companies deny claims, not only because
paying excluded claims threatens the public interest, but also because the
claims are not worthy of payment. As such, the story of the immoral
insured is a permutation of the archetypal story about the depravity of those
who threaten the public interest (with "public," of course, being defined
by the narrator).
The link between the two sets of stories is made explicit in this
account by a claims manager from American Family Insurance Group:
Alertness to the possibility of fraud is one of the basic
ingredients in being a laimsman ....
"Unjust claims under liability coverage are resisted, even
though they may be small .... We have an obligation to the public
and to our policy holders to detect fraud and resist fraudulent claims"
62
Therefore, a central part of the job of an adjuster is checking facts and
59. Interview with anonymous independent adjuster, supra note 54; see also Robert Kopta, Just
Reflecting. INS. ADJUSTER, Jan. 1970, at 5 ("As virtually everyone-particularly claims per-
sonnel-knows, the insurance company is 'fair game.').
60. O'Day, supra note 58, at 5 (quoting George M. Lynch, Jr., Address at the Mutual Loss
Managers' Conference (1969)); see also Ross, supra note 48, at 45 ("The adjuster typically believes
that few people cut false claims from whole cloth, but that nearly everyone exaggerates his loss. This
exaggeration is expected, and the adjuster sees his job as being to reduce the valid claim to an
appropriate size.").
61. Michael H. Boyer, Some People are Dishonest, CLAIMS, Oct. 1993, at 9, 10 (letter to the
editor); cf. SAMUEL MARSHALL, TREATisE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 685 (1805). Although less
pessimistic about the frequency of fraudulent claims, Marshall was determined that those who seek to
defraud insurance companies should be unsuccessful in their efforts:
Where a loss has happened, and there is no colour to suspect any unfair practice on the
part of the insured, 1 think the offices ought not to content themselves with being merely
just- They ought to be generous and liberal towards a fair sufferer. But where there is
any reasonable ground to suspect fraud, it is to be hoped that the managers of no office
will, from any false notion of generosity, or any wish to acquire popular favour, so far
forget what they owe to the public, as well as to their own characters, as to suffer the
claim to be satisfied, without the most scrupulous investigation.
Id.
62. Where Attorneys' and Adjusters' Methods Differ, INS. ADJUSTER, Jan. 1969, at 24 (quoting
Bert Hutchison, Milwaukee branch claims manager, American Family Insurance Group).
1412
1994] Constructing the Insurance Relationship 1413
looking out for fraud, an effort that benefits not only the insurance
company but also those in the insurance pool.6
The story of the immoral insured plays an important role in the self-
definition of the adjuster. Without the story, the adjuster would be a clerk;
with the story, the adjuster is a detective. As Benjamin Horton noted,
[e]very adjuster likes to tell success stories, that includes me. My
favorite ones center around those occasions where I have been
involved with fraud. There are few thrills greater in loss work than
to spot a crooked claim, investigate from that standpoint, prove the
fraud and make it possible for the company to avoid payment."
While the image of the insurance adjuster as detective may have been more
salient a generation ago,' it still is an important archetype. In my
interviews with adjusters, their pride in catching fraudulent claimants is
evident, as is their conviction that a great deal of exaggeration, or "soft
fraud," exists, about which they can do nothing.'
The story of the immoral insured also provides a backstop for the
insurance-as-contract laims story. Adjusters hear the sales stories too, and
they confront insureds' expectations on a daily basis. In that sense,
adjusters live the conflict between the claims stories and the sales stories.
The presumption that many insureds are exaggerating their claims provides
comfort to the adjuster who denies or reduces a claim.
63. See Robert Kopta, Just Reflecting, INs. ADJUSTER, Feb. 1974, at 5 ("In large measure
verifying the facts is a protection for all insureds to prevent payment of false or excess claims. Even
a beginning student of insurance will recognize that rates and premiums will be elevated by over
payment [sicl of claims.").
64. Horton, supra note 47, at 10.
65. For a time in the 1960s, Insurance Adjuster ran a regular feature on fictional fraud cases that
featured the insurance adjuster as detective. See, e.g.. The Case of the Injured Jaguar, INS. ADJUSTER.
Apr. 1969, at 59. Advertisements for adjusting services from that time featured men in trench coats.
fedoras, and other accouterments of that generation's view of the detective. E.g., INs. ADJUSTER, Apr.
1969, at 12 (advertisement for Scott Wetzel Company); INs. ADJUSTER. May 1969, at 19
(advertisement for Scott Wetzel Company). A fictional claims manager in a 1944 motion picture
described adjusters ("claims men") as "a doctor and a bloodhound and a cop and a judge and a father
confessor all in one." DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount 1944) (relating the tale of a shifty insurance
salesman and a beautiful woman who become involved in a scheme to kill the woman's husband and
cash in on his insurance policy).
66. The sense of frustration that this conviction engenders has long been used to justify an alleged
reluctance to pay claims. As Samuel Marshall noted nearly 190 years ago,
With us, if there are a few underwriters, who, under the guidance of ill advisers,
sometimes set up unworthy objections, there are many who are the victims of their own
good faith and easy credulity .... The most cautious find it extremely difficult to escape
the snares which knavery prepares for them. No wonder, then, if they are sometimes
tempted to make captious exceptions, when it is considered that they can only see with
the eyes of the insured, that, in general, they can only defend themselves by such papers,
and other scraps of evidence as they can obtain from the same quarter: and that, with all
the precautions they can employ, they often pay what they might justifiably dispute.
MARsRALL, supra note 61, at 40.
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C. Sales Stories Versus Claims Stories
The longevity of the sales stories suggests that insurance marketers
believe the stories help sell insurance, and the small percentage of litigated
insurance claims67 is at least consistent with the theory that the claims
stories persuade claimants to acquiesce in the insurance law of the adjuster.
While it is impossible to be certain why the stories work, their respons-
iveness to the fundamental tensions in the insurance relationship must play
a part. By linking insurance to other comfortable relationships of
dependency, the sales stories soften the "Lear" tensions in the money-for-
promise arrangement.68 And, by characterizing the insurance adjuster
who says "no" as the guardian of the public trust, the claims stories
mediate the tensions between present and future claimants.
Nevertheless, any business that sells itself as a good neighbor and then
acts like a suspicious and parsimonious trustee is bound to disappoint
expectations, even among those who consciously discount the sales stories.
Consider, for example, the disjuncture between the relationships conjured
up by the sales stories' "parent" and "neighbor" on the one hand and the
claim stories' "contract" on the other. As this contrast suggests, the sales
and claims stories contain quite different visions of the insurance
relationship. In the claims stories, the help available to the insured is
precisely defined by a legal document. The type and level of that help is
a function of the insured's prior contribution to the insurance fund, and the
claimant's interests are largely opposed to those of the insurance company
(and, through the company, to those of the public trust).69
67. See Gallagher, supra note 17, at 29 (reporting that the Florida Department of Insurance
received complaints regarding only 21,293 of 635,874 total hurricane claims following Hurricane
Andrew, and that complaints filed against solvent insurers represented 2.7% of total claims volume).
68. As Ken Casebeer has reminded me, the sales stories may also work because of the historical
evolution of the insurance function, in which the composition of the group cushioning the impact of
individual catastrophes hifted over time from kinship networks to church and guild, to ethnic and trade
based mutuals, and to the immediate precursors of the insurance giants that protect us today. See
GEORGE CLAYTON, BRITISH INSURANCE 20 (197 1) (discussing secular and religious guilds and noting
that one major purpose of guilds was to secure members from risks, including risks of property loss).
Thus, the references to kin, neighborhood, community, and God may respond to and invoke historically
embedded cultural expectations ahout the kind of relationship we have with the entity that protects us
from catastrophes.
69. When an insurance company defends an insured against a claim by a third party, the interests
of the insurer and insured are aligned to a significant extent, in that both would like the claimsnt to
lose. Notwithstanding this alignment, there are significant conflicts within the third-party insurance
relationship that become salient most commonly in cases involving settlement offers or allegations of
intentional torts. See Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. 1976) (en banc)
(holding that when an attorney who has been retained by an insurer to represent the insured obtains
information that could be detrimental to the insured's interest under the policy, that attorney should
notify the insurer that he can no longer represent its interests); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958) (en banc) (holding that when an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend
an insured and wrongfully refuses to accept a settlement offer within the policy limits, the insurer is
liable for the entirejudgment, even if it exceeds the policy limits).
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The sales stories, in contrast, concern relationships in which interests
are aligned and help is given in an open-ended fashion, with little attention
given to the prior contribution of the person in need.7 That is not to say
that relationships in a family, between neighbors, or within a religious
community always ignore the relative contributions of the individuals
within them, but simply that the role of exchange within those relationships
is understood to be subordinate.71
Examining the sales stories' description of the claims process makes
this contrast particularly sharp. The primary image guiding real adjusters
is "contract." Yet that image is nowhere present in the sales stories'
description of the claims process. The insurance advertisements hat
contain these stories feature the insurance company as a hero rescuing the
policyholder in distress, often through superhuman powers. For example,
a recent radio campaign for an automobile insurance company in Florida
features claims adjusters who arrive at the scene of the accident before the
police, to calm the policyholder and, among other things, offer a rental car
without asking whether the policyholder had purchased rental car coverage
and without discussing the daily rate limitation.' A USF&G Insurance
print campaign with the theme "Another case for USF&G" reports actual
claims experiences that are nearly as incredible.3 A Cigna Property and
Casualty Insurance Company print advertising campaign opens with the
claim that "[elvery day, someone calls us from inside a nightmare," and
reports how Cigna takes care of nightmares.' The point: we will take
care of you, with money and compassion. The omission: terms of the
contract.
Insurance companies minimize the potential for direct conflict between
the sales and claims stories by separating the organizational responsibility
70. The sales stories align well with Duncan Kennedy's standards/substance/altruismformula, and
the claims stories with his rules/form/individualism concept. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1713-22 (1976) (introducing two
paradigms for analyzing substantive law: individualism, which focuses solely on the form of a
transaction, and altruism, which focuses on the substance of the transaction or contrac). As will be
discussed below, the visions of the insurance relationship reflected in the sales and claims stories also
appear in judicial opinions in insurance coverage cases. This Paper can therefore be regarded, to that
limited extent, as a case study of the "private law" rhetorical modes that Kennedy identified. See
Kennedy, supra, at 1713-22.
71. See Pierre Bourdieu, 77te Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RSMEARCH FOR
THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 250-51 (John G. Richardson ed. & Richard Nice trans., 1986)
(describing the role of exchange within social groups and explaining that the most powerful person or
entity within a social group is responsible for defending the weaker members of the group whenever
they are threatened).
72. Unexpected w/800# (radio advertisement for Progressive Car Insurance, Oct. 26, 1993)
(transcript on file with the Texas Law Review).
73. E.g., NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1992, at 78-79 (advertisement for USF&G Insurance Company).




for the narration of the two sets of stories. The sales and marketing
departments tell the sales stories, and the claims department ells the claims
stories. The head of one insurance claims department explained the reason
for making claims departments independent of the "production" (i.e., sales)
department:
There is no question but what the ultimate goal of any profit-
making organization is to satisfy as many good customers as
possible. There are, however, occasions when "no" must be
said ....
... [W]hen the producer can point to the claim department as
the "culprit" who makes coverage decisions, the heat is off of
him.75
Nevertheless, this division of responsibility cannot eliminate the conflict
between the sales and the claims stories. At least some insureds whose
understanding of insurance reflects that of the sales stories will rebel
against the contract-oriented law of the adjuster. At that point, litigation
begins.
II. Judging the Insurance Relationship
The conflicting images of the insurance relationship reflected in the
sales and claims stories carry over into litigation. Instead of the insurance
marketing department, the insured now tells the sales story, while the
insurance company repeats the claims story told during negotiation.
Because judges are sometimes persuaded by insureds' versions of the sales
stories and at other times by insurance companies' claims stories (and
because judges already hold these competing understandings of insurance),
both sets of stories appear in their opinions. Like the other participants in
the litigation, judges use these stories both to understand and to explain the
obligations of parties in an insurance relationship.'
75. Patrick Magarick, Status Among Departments: 'Pressured" Claims Dept. Is Badfor Business,
INS. ADJUSrm, June 1969, at 13, 13-14. Robert Kopta, an editor of Insurance Adjuster, described one
source of conflicts between producers and claims departments as fbllows:
One of the most annoying sources of unnecessary claims problems is the agent (not
the usual agent) who knowingly refers a claim to his company that is not covered by the
policy.
This situation becomes extremely uncomfortable for all parties involved when the
insured believes in good faith that he has coverage for the loss and he is encouraged in
this belief by the producer.
Robert Kopta, Just Reflecting, INS. ADJUSTER, Jan. 1972, at 5.
76. Cf. Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of Storytelling in Law, 23 RuTOrZS L.J. 79, 91 (1991)
(reviewing DAVID R. PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING
AND THS LAW (1991)) ("Lawyers, clients and judges are, after all, human. To solve legal problems,
they will draw not only on specialized technical legal skills, but also on their general competence as
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It would be misleading, however, to imply that the sales and claims
stories are equally represented in published insurance decisions. The
"insurance-as-contract" story is typically the baseline.' Many, if not
most, courts-whether deciding in favor of insurance companies or in-
sureds-rely heavily on a straightforward interpretation of the insurance
company's printed form.78 While less common, the "immoral insured"
and "responsibility-to-others" claims stories appear as well.79
human beings. A significant component of that competence involves using stories as devices through
which they can understand and explain the world." (footnote omitted)).
77. In addressing general insurance contract doctrine, insurance casebookstypically give as much,
if not more, attention to cases containing sales stories as to cases containing claims stories. See, e.g.,
SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 8-31 (1992); KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 33-52 (1990); ALAN 1.
WIDISS, INSURANCE MATERIALS ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND
REGULATORY ACTS 599-654 (1989) (all presenting cases in which the court construed ambiguities
against the insurer, honored the expectations of the insured, and required good faith by the insurer).
For that reason, some insurance law teachers may find jarring my assertion that the insurance-as-
contract story is the judicial baseline. As the cases cited infra note 78 suggest, however, some judges
are likely to find even more jarring the assertion that the cases containing the sales stories present a
reasonably coherent and defensible alternative vision of the insurance relationship.
A detailed analysis of the relative frequencies of the stories in judicial opinions is beyond the
scope of this article. Which set of stories-sales or claims-is the "baseline" in insurance case law,
and which set is the "exception," may depend on who is selecting the sample from which the baseline-
exception judgment is made. It is more than sufficient for my purposes to note that the baseline is
contested. See Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for
the Function, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 1037, 1047-58 (1991) (describing competing theories in i surance cases
of judicial formalism and judicial functionalism and disagreeing with commentators about the extent
of the alleged decline of formalism in insurance contract cases). The existence of even a weak claim
on either side of the argument demonstrates that there are competing visions of the insurance
relationship in the judicial decisions.
78. Examples of insurance-as-contract opinions include Brown v. Equitable Life Insurance Co.,
211 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Wis. 1973) ("We think the theory of strict contractual construction of insurance
contracts followed by a majority of jurisdictions is consistent with the philosophy of this court.");
California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Warwick, 550 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Cal. 1976) ("IT]he
determinative issue is whether [the insurance policy] language is sufficiently clear to put the
policyholder on notice."); Ryan v. Harrison, 699 P.2d 230. 233 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (construing
an insurance policy based solely on its contractual language, without consideration of reasonable
expectations). The Supreme Court of Wyoming recently gave this forceful statement of its formalist
position:
If the policy language is clear and unambiguous, the rule of strict construction
against the insurer does not apply, and the policy must be interpreted in accordance with
the ordinary and usual meaning of its terms. The parties to an insurance contract are free
to incorporate within the policy whatever lawful terms they desire, and the courts are not
at liberty, under the guise ofjudicial construction, to rewrite the policy.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Wyo.
1988) (citations omitted).
79. For the "immoral insured" story, see Future Realty, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,
315 F. Suop. 1109, 1116 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (dismissing a coverage suit on a fire policy that had been
suspended due to the abandonment of the premises and the corresponding increase in moral hazard,
defined by the court as "any change in the insured property that increases the probability of destruction
by the owner or others"); Davenport v. Firemen's Insurance Co., 199 N.W. 203, 205 (S.D. 1924)
(upholding the suspension of an insurance policy because of an increase in moral hazard, defined by
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The quantitative dominance of the claims stories notwithstanding, there
are important competing stories-the judicial versions of the "sales"
stories-found in cases. Two consistent patterns can be found in these
competing stories: First, they appear in cases favoring insureds, typically
after it becomes clear that the "insurance-as-contract" story would have
produced a different result.' This pattern confirms that the "insurance-
as-contract" claims story is at least the rhetorical norm.81 Second, they
appear in damages discussions only in bad faith cases.
A. The Sales Stories in Judicial Opinions
The vision of insurance reflected in the judicial versions of the sales
stories stands in marked contrast to the images invoked by the insurance-as-
contract claims story. In the judicial sales story, insurance is less a
"contract" than a "relationship." While there clearly is a contract
involved, that contract is defined only in part by the insurance company's
printed form.' It is also defined by the "special relationship" between
insurance companies and their policyholders, a relationship, the opinions
the court as "the risk, the danger, or probability that the insured will destroy or permit to be destroyed
the insured property for the purpose of collecting the insurance"). C. Bollinger v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co.,
154 P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1944) (en bane) ("When claims are honestly made care should be taken to
prevent technical forfeitures such as would ensue from an unreasonable enforcement of a rule of
procedure unrelated to the merits." (citations omitted)). For the "responsibility-to-others" story, see
Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co.. 371 A.2d 193. 205 (Pa. 1977) ("[T]he purpose of the
requirement of notice is to give the insurer reasonable opportunity to protect its rights. In so doing,
however, the insurer ... often is serving the best interests of its insureds as a group." (quoting
ROBERT E. KEETON, BAsic TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 7.2(a), at 445 (1971)).
80. An exception to this pattern is Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966) (en
banc). In Gray. Justice Tobriner first finds for the insured under a "reasonable expectations" approach
that I would describe as a "sales story," but then states that the insured would also prevail under a
contra proferentem analysis (interpreting ambiguities against the insurer), which is in line with the
insurance-as-contractstory. Id. at 171.
81. The court in one of the leading sales-story cases, C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual
Insurance Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975), described its version of the rhetorical norm, and why
that norm has persisted, as follows:
In fairness to the often-discerned ability of the common law to develop solutions
for changing demands, it should be noted appellate courts take cases as they come,
constrained by issues the litigants formulated in trial court-a point not infrequently
overlooked by academicians. Nor can a lawyer in the ordinary case be faulted for not
risking a client's cause on an uncharted course when there is a reasonable prospect of
reaching a fair result through familiar channels of long-accepted legal principles, for
example, those grounded on ambiguity in language, the duty to define limitations or
exclusions in clear and explicit terms, and interpretation of language from the viewpoint
of an ordinary person, not a specialist or expert.
Id. at 175 (citation omitted).
82. See Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 441, 446 (Ariz. 1982) (en bane) ("The
rules pertaining to the enforcement of the 'bargain' made by the parties evolved at a time when the
parties negotiated an insurance contract. they have little or no relevance to the present methods of
transacting most insurance business.").
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stress, through which policyholders seek "security" and "peace of mind,"
not commercial advantage.'
The courts' descriptions of this special relationship resonate strongly
with the vision of insurance portrayed in insurance advertising. As in the
advertisements, the special relationship begins with the purchase of a
"good" called "insurance," not with the negotiation of a contract."
Within this relationship, the insurance company is the stronger party,
responsible for taking care of the weaker, dependent insured.5 At no
time is the insurance company stronger and the insured more vulnerable
than when the insured suffers a loss.8" If the insurance relationship is to
83. As one court noted:
[The] plaintiff did not seek by the contract involved here to obtain a commercial
advantagebut to protect berself against the risks of accidental losses, including the mental
distress which might follow from the losses. Among the considerations in purchasing
liability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind and security it will
provide in the event of an accidental loss, and recovery of damages for mental suffering
has been permitted for breach of contracts which directly concern the comfort, happiness
or personal esteem of one of the parties.
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967); see also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d
565, 575 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) ("When dealing with an innkeeper, a common carrier, a lawyer, a
doctor or an insurer, the client/customer seeks service, security, peace of mind, protection or some
other intangible. These types of contracts create special, partly noncommercial relationships. . .");
Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (Ct. App. 1970) (quoting Crisci, 426
P.2d at 179, and stating that the "considerations are particularly cogent in disability insurance");
Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 152 (Kan. 1980) ("When an insured
purchases insurance, he is purchasing more than financial security; he is purchasing peace of mind.");
McCorkle v. Great Ad. Ins. Co., 637 P.2d 583, 588 (Okla. 1981) ("[O]ne of the primary reasons a
consumer purchases any type of insurance (and the insurance industry knows this) is the peace of mind
and security that it provides in the event of loss."); Beck v. Farmera Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802
(Utah 1985) ("[fIt is axiomatic that insurance frequently is purchased not only to provide funds in case
of loss, but to provide peace of mind for the insured or his beneficiaries.").
84. See State Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Kintner, 185 N.E.2d 527, 532 (Ind. 1962) (declaring that
"[tihere is some analogy between the sale of goods and the sale of an insurance policy as a package");
C & J Ferilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 178-79 (observing that "[the typical applicant buys 'protection' much
as he buys groceries" and noting that "[w]e would be derelict in our duty to administer justice if we
were not to judicially know that modem insurance companies have turned to mass advertising to sell
'protection'" (quoting WALTER H.E. JAEOFR, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900, at 34 (3d ed. 1963)));
cf. Macneil, supra note 14, at 17 (arguing for a reconception of contracts of adhesion as bureaucratic
goods).
85. See Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428, 430 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977) (stating that "the unequal bargaining power of the parties" is a "paramount
consideration[ ]" in the adoption of a rule allowing recovery of consequential damages on a showing
of bad faith).
86. See Eckemrodev. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972) (remarking that "[tfhe
very risks insured against presuppose that upon the death of the insured the beneficiary might be in
difficult circumstances and thus particularly susceptible and vulnerable to high pressure tactics by an
economically powerful entity"); Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981)
(noting that because an insurance policy is obtained as a 'protection against calamity," "[olften the
insured is in an especially vulnerable economic position when.., a casualty loss occurs"); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1273 (Colo. 1985) (asserting that "once a calamity has befallen...
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work, insureds must be able to count on insurance companies to come
through in that vulnerable moment with "the basic insurance protection
which it has held out to the insured."'
While these insurance stories do not feature the parents, neighbors,
and demigods of insurance advertising, the insurance relationship they
describe is that of the sales stories-a relationship in which policyholders
need to be able to trust and depend on insurance companies to take care of
them in a time of need. The role of the courts in these stories is to make
sure that insurance companies provide the complete protection they
promised, even when that promise conflicts with the printed form."
Whether the doctrinal concept is reasonable expectations," latent
ambiguity,' contract of adhesion,9  or warranty of fitness,'  the
an insured covered under a private insurance contract, the injured party is particularly vulnerable
because of the injury or loss").
87. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 179 (Cal. 1966). The Arizona Supreme Court
described the power of the insurance company in that vulnerable moment as follows:
[T]he nature of the [insurance] relationship effectively give[s] the insurer an almost
adjudicatory responsibility. The insurer evaluates the claim, determines whether it falls
within the coverage provided, assesses its monetary value, decides on its validity and
passes upon payment. Although the insured is not without remedies if he disagrees with
the insurer, the very invocationof those remedies detracts significantly from the protection
or security which was the object of the transaction.
Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 570.
88. See C & JFertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 178 (remarking that "[a] person who has beenincessantly
assured a given company's policies will afford him complete protection is unlikely to be wary enough
to search his policy"); Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406, 414 (N.J. 1985) (asserting that the
court's goal in insurance policy interpretation is to foster the reasonable expectations of the average
buyer); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc.. 250 N.W.2d 663, 670 (N.D. 1977) (discussing insurer
obligations that may exist even though they are in conflict with the terms of the contract).
89. See Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 170 A.2d 22, 30 (NJ. 1961) (declaring that "the
court's goal in construing an accident insurance policy is to effectuate the reasonable expectations of
the average member of the public who buys it"); Keeton, supra note 15, at 961 (stating that courts that
address the rights of insurance policyholders often base their decisions on the principle of honoring the
reasonable expectations of the applicants and intended beneficiaries).
90. See Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 421 & n.7 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (stating that courts use the "latent ambiguity device" as a method to overcome the
constraint against extrinsic evidence by allowing the introduction of evidence of the insured's
understanding of the adhesion agreement).
91. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979) (commenting that
because insurance policies are treated as "contracts of adhesion" when the court is interpreting the
language of the policy, the policy is to be construed "to provide that coveragewhich a layperson would
have reasonably expected from a lay interpretation of the policy terms"); see also Edwin W. Patterson,
The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 856 (1964) (describing the
concept "contract of adhesion" as a rule of construction in which the court favors the weaker party
whenever "it appears that the drafting party was in the stronger bargaining position"); cf. Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1983)
(advocating judicial reconstruction of adhesion contracts to restore freedom of contract).
92. See C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 177-79 (holding that the insured should prevail because
the insurer "breached an implied warranty that the policy later delivered would be reasonably fit for
its intended purpose").
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insurance company's obligations are rooted, not in its standard form, nor
even in the particular situation of the insured in the case at hand, but rather
in the court's conception of the insurance relationship.
Consider the much maligned doctrine of reasonable expectations.'
As Professor Keeton made clear in his articulation of the doctrine, the
"expectations" that govern the contract are not those of the particular
insured in the particular case, but rather those of the "reasonable"
insured.' Judges are to determine these "objectively" reasonable
expectations, not through fact-finding, but through the exercise of a
considered judgment that Karl Llewellyn would have found congenial.95
When, almost by definition, the standard-form insurance policy does not
provide proper guidance, where else can judges turn but to some alterna-
tive vision of insurance? Given the ubiquity of the insurance companies'
sales stories, the stories' congruence with the Lear tensions in the insurance
relationship, and their resonance with the cultural residue of pre-insurance
arrangements,' it is no surprise that he courts' "alternative" vision turns
out to be at least consistent with, if not derived from, these stories.
That judges find obligations in insurance stories, rather than in
rigorously demonstrated social facts, is hardly cause for consternation.
There is little alternative. The "social facts"-what people actually think
they are getting when they buy insurance or, alternatively, the breadth of
insurance coverage that insurance companies can provide at a price that
people are willing to pay-are as yet unknown (and may be
unknowable).' Moreover, as in so many other arenas, the formalist
93. Compare Rakoff, supra note 91, at 1268-69 (attacking the reasonable expectations doctrine
as a fiction that courts have created to avoid addressing the implications of contracts of adhesion) with
StephenJ. Ware, Note, A Critique ofthe Reasonable ExpectationsDoctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461,
1487-93 (1989) (criticizing the doctrine as limiting the freedom of contract and interfering with market
control of insurance companies).
94. Keeton, supra note 15, at 967-69.
95. See KARi_ N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADION 121 n.154 (1960) (referring to the
"frequent determinative character" of a hunch or insight); K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 700, 704 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Book Review] ("[Tihe conditions and clauses to be
read into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread paper, but are those which
a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that paper.").
96. See supra note 68.
97. I have tried to find out the first social fact (i.e., what people think they are getting when they
buy insurance), through both a survey of 7000 University of Miami employees following Hurricane
Andrew and in-depth interviews with claimants. I have reached the tentative conclusion that neither
project will provide information that will be useful in guiding a "reasonable expectations" analysis.
The second social fact (i.e., the breadth of coverage that insurance companies can provide at a price
that people can pay) would be even more difficult to determine. While we can (relatively) easily
determine the breadth of coverage sold by insurance companies, and can safely infer that the coverage
was offered at a price people could pay, institutional constraints and a cooperative drafting of standard
formis by insurance companies make it highly unlikely that the market has disciplined insurance
companies to the point that existing policies are optimal.
19941 1421
Texas Law Review [Vol. 72:1395
result-adhering to the terms of the standard-form policy-sometimes gen-
erates outcomes that judges are (and should be) unwilling to accept.9"
Indeed, what would be cause for consternation would be an insurance law
that failed to reflect the duality of our everyday construction of the
insurance relationship.
B. The Insurance Stories and the Bad Faith Case
While courts differ in the precise standard they apply when determin-
ing bad faith, the standards all focus on the insurance company's intent
(whether subjectively or objectively determined) in denying the claim. For
example, under the widely adopted Anderson standard," the insured must
prove
the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy
and the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of
a reasonable basis for denying the claim."
The debate over the tort or contract nature of the insurance bad faith action
is still simmering.1"' While the balance of judicial authority clearly
favors a tort theory,1  the resolution of that debate need not affect this
analysis. Even jurisdictions that favor a contract-based bad faith action use
an intent test for bad faith damages.3
98. See Kennedy, supra note 70, at 1689 (stating that a cost of the certainty that formalist rules
promote is the "sacrifice of precision in the achievement of the objectives lying behind the rules"); see
also Rakoff, supra note 91. at 1176 (arguing that the terms of adhesion contracts should be declared
presumptively unenforceable because, contrary to the assumption of equal bargaining power in ordinary
contract law, contracts of adhesion are the result of one party's commercial dominance).
99. Henderson, supra note 12, at 40 ("Of the twenty-nine jurisdictions that now permit extra-
contractual damages in first-party insurance cases on some basis akin to the tort of bad faith, ten
purport to follow the Anderson test." (footnotes omitted)).
100. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
101. See, e.g., Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Lunsford, 621 So. 2d 977, 980-81 (Ala. 1993)
(Maddox, J., dissenting in part) (arguing against the majority's adopting the "bad faith" tort and in
favor of providing only contractual remedies). See generally Jerry, supra note 8 (evaluating two
competing viewpoints and positing a new approach in which the duty of good faith would be treated
as a contractual duty, but the range of remedies in insurance cases would be broader than usual
contractual remedies).
102. See McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 857 & n.5 (Wyo. 1990) (citing
cases from over 25 jurisdictions that recognize a tort theory of recovery for bad faith conduct of the
insurer); Linda Curtis, Damage Measurements for Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic
Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REv. 161, 173 (1986) ("[T]he courts in a majority of the states [have found]
that a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing sufficiently involves a public policy interest to
be treated as a tort.").
103. See also McCullough, 789 P.2d at 857 (noting that some jurisdictions label bad faith as a
contractual theory, but allow recovery of punitive damages when an insurer possesses a culpable mental
state); see also e.g., Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986)
(recognizing that "an insurer is not liable for punitive damages by its refusal to pay on a claim unless
such a refusal is accompanied by a malicious intention to injure or defraud").
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But why care about intent in a contract case? Doesn't this, or even
a tort-based bad faith action, confuse "tort" and "contract"? My answer,
it will be no surprise to learn, is that the intent question makes perfect
sense in the context of the sales stories, and that these stories, not the
logical niceties of contract (or tort) doctrine, drive the development of the
bad faith action. We do not have "contracts" with the kin, friends,
neighbors, and religious communities in whose images we have (partially)
constructed the insurance relationship. When they let us down, we care
intensely whether they did so "by mistake" or "on purpose." It is, for
example, the callous, deliberate nature of Regan's and Goneril's abandon-
ment of King Lear that exposes their evil and presages the fate that awaits
them. We do not expect perfection from the people we trust, but we do
expect them not to betray us.
When the Arizona Supreme Court asserted in Rawlings v. Apo-
daca4 that we expect insurance companies to make mistakes, and that
intent matters, the court was reflecting these stories." Intent matters
because we try to punish those who betray us. Where that court (and
others) went wrong, however, was not in confusing tort and contract but,
rather, in confusing compensatory and punitive damages. As the next
discussion attempts to show, awarding complete compensatory damages
only as punishment for betrayal, and not for an ordinary mistake, violates
the practical logic that calls for distinguishing between mistake and betrayal
in the first place. Because the bad faith action is about betrayal, the
purpose of its damages should be punishment, not compensation. Com-
pensation should be the province of the ordinary insurance action, and that
compensation should be as complete as the courts can make it.
IIU. Reconstructing Insurance Contract Damages
In the typical opinion in the ordinary insurance coverage case, there
is little or no discussion of the damages the insured will recover. When
there is a discussion about damages, it usually consists of an invocation of
the contract damages "rule" of the jurisdiction and a statement that the
additional damages the insured requested-usually for emotional distress or
attorney fees-are excluded by that rule."° In that regard, the insurance
104. 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986).
105. Id. at 573 ("Insurance companies, like other enterprises and all human beings, are far from
perfect. Papers get lost, telephone messages misplaced, and claims ignored because paperwork was
misfiled or improperly processed.").
106. See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Mich. 1980) ("[I]t is
generally held that damages for mental distress cannot be recovered in an action for breach of
contract."); Holmesv. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 258 S.E.2d 924, 926 (S.C. 1979) (invoking the "rule
in contract actions" to limit an award of damages (quoting Hutson v. Continental Assurance Co., 237
S.E.2d 375,379 (S.C. 1977))). Many courts, of course, provide complete compensatory damages and,
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coverage cases follow the pattern of contract cases generally. As Timothy
Sullivan has suggested, common-law contract damage limitations appear to
rest on a surprisingly narrow foundation.7 Peeling away the onion of
precedent reveals a final core of nineteenth-century treatises that simply
recite the classical contract damages "rules" without analysis."
The elements of harm to an insured that are typically left out by the
classical contract damages rules include: the cost of hiring an attorney to
bring an action enforcing the policy,"° the emotional distress associated
with the denial of the claim and the prolonged delay before payment,110
and financial losses that run afoul of the court's (narrow) interpretation of
the requirement that consequential damages be foreseeable at the time of
contracting."' While prejudgment interest is commonly available by
statute,12 such interest is a poor measure of the insured's lost utility,
because the financial straits that can accompany casualty or property losses
can make the claimant a poor credit risk."' Statutory provisions for the
in some cases, punitive damages in bad faith insurance cases. See, e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court, 693
P.2d 796, 800 (Cal. 1985) (permitting recovery of attorney fees in a bad faith case); Bibeault v.
Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319 (R.I. 1980) (holding that damages for economic loss and
emotional distress are recoverable in a bad faith case).
107. See Timothy J. Sullivan, Pwitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the
Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 221 (1977) ("One of the principle impediments to
analysis of contract cases treating the question of punitive damages is the consistent absence,
particularly in the early cases, of any meaningful judicial discussion of the philosophy of damage
law.").
108. See id. at 221 (asserting that older cases cited treatises that, when examined, "produce no
more enlightenment han the opinion which invoked its authority"). A recent survey of cases denying
recovery for mental or emotional distress in contract cases concluded that "[tihe cases denying damages
obviously accept he general prohibition. However, there is little or no consistency in the opinions as
to why the proscriptive rule should be followed." Joseph P. Toman, Contract Compensation in
Nonmarket Transactions, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 867, 893 (1985).
109. See Mustachiov. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 118 Cal. Rptr. 581,584 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding
that, absenta finding of "bad faith," attorney fees are not recoverable in a breach of insurance contract
action); AFA Protective Sys., Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 549 N.Y.S.2d 783, 786 (App. Div. 1990)
(holding that the insured "is not entitled to reimbursement for legal fees incurred in connection with
the prosecution" of an action to declare the rights of the insured under an insurance policy).
110. See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980) (holding
that, absent proof that compensationfor mental anguish was contemplated by the parties at the time the
contract was made, "the damages recoverable do not include... mental anguish").
111. See Holmes v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 258 S.E.2d 924, 927 (S.C. 1979) (finding that
interest on loans taken out to pay bills that should have been paid by the insurer is not recoverable).
But see Hochmanv. American Family Ins. Co., 673 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that interest paid on loans taken out to cover delay in payment by the insurance company is foreseeable
and hence recoverable). For a listing of cases in which insureds recovered consequential pecuniary
losses, see ALLAN D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 6.37, at 376 (2d ed. 1988).
112. See AnthonyE. Rothschild, Comment, PrejudgmentInterest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw.
U. L. REV. 192, 193 n.6 (1982) (listing state prejudgment interest statutes).
113. In a jurisdiction in which attorneys' fees are available as an element of recovery, an insured
who has ready access to other sources of money may well be compensated adequately b prejudgment
interest. The insurance company's breach harms the insured only by depriving her of the use of the
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recovery of attorney fees in insurance coverage cases provide a more
significant supplement to common-law contract damages in many
states,u 4 but other states, including California and New York, do not
have such statutes.115
These prevailing limits on insurance contract damages are not, how-
ever, universal. The Supreme Court of Alabama recently awarded com-
pensation for mental anguish in an ordinary insurance coverage case.
16
A Michigan Supreme Court justice, strongly dissenting in Kewin v.
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.," would have affirmed an
intermediate appellate court decision that reached the same result."' The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has permitted damages in an or-
dinary insurance case for "aggravation and inconvenience,"119 an ap-
proach that, if anything, allows recovery broader than an approach based
on emotional distress. The highest courts of Washington, West Virginia,
and Minnesota have permitted the recovery of attorney fees as contract
damages in insurance cases." The Utah Supreme Court has stated that
it will permit recovery for mental anguish "in unusual cases."" And the
money that she diverts; prejudgment interest is an imperfect, but not terrible, measure of that
opportnity cost. See id. at 205 (noting that "in Texas, prejudgment interest is correctly viewed as
compensation for the use or detention of money"). Anybody who does not bave ready access to
money, however, is going to do without in the interim; prejudgment interest is a poor measure of the
"aggravation and inconvenience" inherent in that. Cf. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,
352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986) (upholding an award of damages for "aggravation and inconven-
ience" suffered by an insured as the result of insurer's delay in settlement).
114. See Dianne K. Ericsson, Declaratory Judgment: Is It a Real or Illusory Solution?, 23 ToRT
& INs. LJ. 161, 170-77 (1987) (summarizing the availability of recovery of attorney fees in insurance
cases).
115. See supra note 109.
116. IndependentFire Ins. Co. v. Lunsford, 621 So. 2d 977, 979 (Ala. 1993).
117. 295 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1980).
118. Justice Williams wrote that:
[lt is common knowledge that disability insurance is obtained to promote peace of mind
and avoid the insecurity and anguish of being disabled and without a paycheckto meet the
normal demands of life. Consequently, that failure to provide such contracted-for peace
of mind promotes emotional distress requires no argument.
Id. at 57 (Williams, I., dissenting).
119. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73, 80 (W. Va. 1986) (giving
as an example of compensable aggravation and inconvenience the case of "a family of five that is
required to live for four years in a trailer because an insurance company has declined to pay the fire
policy").
120. Olympic S.S. Co. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 673, 681 (Wash. 1991) (allowing
recovery of attorney fees incurred when an insurer refuses to defend or pay for the justified claim of
an insured); Hayseeds, 352 5.E.2d at 79 (holding insurers liable for attorney fees when an insured is
successful in an action against he insurer); Lanoue v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 49,
55 (Minn. 1979) (allowing recovery of attorney fees when the insurance contract is "intended to relieve
the insured of the financial burden of litigation" and the insurer has failed to defend).
121. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) ("[I]t is axiomatic that insurance
frequently is purchased not only to provide funds in case of loss, but to provide peace of mind for the
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New Hampshire Supreme Court has declared that it would permit the re-
covery of financial losses that might otherwise be excluded under the
traditional approach.12 Of course, these cases are in addition to non-
insurance contract cases awarding such damagesY3
Thus, because courts in some contract cases do award compensation
for the costs of bringing suit and for mental distress (or inconvenience and
aggravation), it is no longer true (if it ever was) that contract damages
necessarily do not include such things. The best that can be said is that
sometimes, even most times, contract damages do not include those things.
A court that honestly faces up to this situation is going to have to provide
something more than the rote "insurance-as-contract" answer to justify
drawing an intent-based line between those victims of late payments who
are compensated for their trouble and those who are not."M The claims
stories and the sales stories provide one way to begin, by grounding
insurance contract damages rules in the descriptions of insurance used by
those in the insurance business.
A. The Sales Stories and Insurance Contract Damages
The lesson of the sales stories is simple: The real promise of the
insurance relationship is not "if Xhappens, we'll pay Ydollars," but rather
"we'll be there for you," keeping your life or business together when
disaster strikes. Thus, while the act that breaches the insurance contract
may be the failure to pay "Y dollars" when "X happens," the promise that
is broken is the promise to "be there." The foreseeable consequences of
breaking that promise are manifold. As our public and private mass-
insured or his beneficiaries. Therefore.... we find no difficulty with the proposition that, in unusual
cases, damages for mental anguish might be provable." (citations omitted)).
122. See Lawton v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 579 (N.H. 1978) (refusing to hold
as a matter of law that the insured cannot recover for financial injuries which result from the insurer's
failure or delay in the payment of policy proceeds).
123. See Charlotte K. Goldberg, Emotional Distress Damages and Breach of Contract: A New
Approach, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 57, 59 (1986) (arguing that damages for emotional distress should
be recoverable when there is an "emotional aspect" to a contract); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History
of the American Rule onAtorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 9, 29 (1984) (discussing
the common benefit theory, "under wbich those receiving what the court consider[s] to be benefits from
a suit can be required to help pay its expenses," as an example of non-traditional measures of
damages); John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon Contract:
Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1565. 1592-93, 1601-09
(1986) (giving example of non-insurance situations in which courts have been willing to award non-
traditional contracts damages); Tomain. supra note 108, at 904 (suggesting that "[damages for
nonpecuniary losses should be awarded for breach of contract when the parties enter into a bargain
which has as its principal function the exchange of a nonpecuniary interest").
124. Cf Oliver W. Holmes, 77w Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) ("It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry
IV.-).
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disaster-relief efforts demonstrate, lives and businesses fall apart when
disaster strikes. The consequences of individual disaster-disability,
sickness, fire, and death-are no less profound. Given the real promise of
the insurance relationship, it does little disservice to Hadley v. Bax-
endale25 and its progeny to award an insured compensation for the
emotional and financial consequences of the insurance company's absence.
Contract law is replete with exceptions to the traditional rule against
damages for emotional distress.1" Such damages are permitted for
breaches of burial contracts,27 contracts for long-term care,12 contracts
for repair of family heirlooms,29 contracts for the construction or
improvement of family homes," contracts related to memorable events
like weddings and vacations,131 and other contracts in which emotional
distress is a foreseeable consequence of breach.1 32  The sales stories
125. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854). The Hadley court held:
Damages... should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself,
or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties,
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of breach of it.
Id. at 151.
126. See Goldberg, supra note 123, at 59-66 (discussing jurisdictions that allow relief for
emotional damages in contract cases); Sebert, supra note 123, at 1585 (providing examples of contract
cases involving emotional distress awards).
127. See, e.g., Ross v. Forest Lawn Memorial Park, 203 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1984)
(awarding emotional distress damages for the breach of a burial contract with the mother of the
deceased that had "put respondent on notice that a breach would result in emotional and mental
suffering by appellant').
128. See, e.g., Guerin v. New Hampshire Catholic Charities, Inc., 418 A.2d 224, 227 (N.H.
1980) (allowing emotional distress damages for mental suffering resulting from a nursing home's
alleged breach of long-term care contract on the basis that such damages were within the contemplation
of the parties).
129. See, e.g., Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39, 44, 44-45 (Ct. App. 1970)
(affirming an award for "physical suffering," including general nervousness and emotional
deterioration, proximately caused by breach of a bailment contract for "cherished mementos").
130. See, e.g., B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667, 672 (Ala. 1979) (allowing
damages for mental distress in an action for breach of construction contract when contractor could have
reasonably foreseen that faulty construction would cause severe mental anguish); B & B Cut Stone Co.
v. Resneck, 465 So. 2d 851, 859-60 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (allowing damages for mental distress for
breach of a contract to install a fireplace hased on the particular aesthetic objective of the fireplace and
the homeowners' showing of inconvenience and disappointment).
131. See, e.g., Deitsch v. Music Co., 453 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1983) (allowing
recovery for mental distress when the parties contemplated that damages resulting from a band's failure
to appear at a wedding reception would be greater than the amount of the deposit); Odysseys Unlimited,
Inc. v. Astral Travel Serv., 354 N.Y.S.2d 88, 92 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (allowing recovery for inconven-
ience, discomfort, and humiliation resulting from the breach of a contract to provide accommodations
for a holiday vacation).
132. See generally Goldberg, supra note 123 (asserting that emotional distress damages should be
allowed as a consequence of a breach of contract when that contract had emotional aspects); Amy H.
Kastely, Compensation for Lost Aesdzetic and Emotional Enjoyment: A Reconsideration of Contract
Damages for Nonpecuniary Loss, 8 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1, 13 (1986) (discussing contracts for which
emotional distress damages are awarded in case of breach).
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demonstrate that emotional distress is at least a foreseeable, if not
inevitable, result of an insurance company's failure to "be there" in time
of need.
As the sales stories make clear, a primary reason for buying insurance
is to avoid emotional distress. Remember, "peace of mind" comes with
every "piece of the rock."133 Emotional support is perhaps the most
significant support we receive from the ideal mothers, fathers, neighbors,
and teammates (not to mention God), whose images the sales stories appro-
priate. No less than the images, insurance companies' words-"trust,""
"security, " 1 "strength, " 131 "promise," 137 "commitment"13S-also
address deep emotional needs. When insurance companies so directly trade
in emotion, courts should not permit them to deny the centrality of that
aspect of life when disputing claims.
B. The Claims Stories and Insurance Contract Damages
The typical "good faith" insurance contract damage case fits well
within the insurance-as-contract laims story. Insurance is a contract. The
damages available for breach are contract damages, and contract damages
do not include compensation for emotional distress or attorney fees. This
incarnation of the insurance-as-contract claims story has had undeniable
impact: real harm has gone uncompensated. But it rests on a false
premise. All the story says is that whatever the contract damages are, the
insurance company will pay. Because sometimes contract damages do in-
clude compensation for emotional distress and attorney fees, the insurance-
as-contract claims story provides little substantive guidance.
139
The claims stories' vision of insurance as a public trust, however, can
provide such guidance. The claims stories stress that it is in the public
interest to incur, and then to spread, the cost of challenging claims.
Whether claims are denied because the written policy does not provide for
payment, because the insurance company has a responsibility to future
claimants, or because the claimants are undeserving, the claims stories
justify the denial by invoking the vision of the insurance company as
guardian of the public trust, preserving the fund for the victims of
tomorrow. The slogan "millions for defense, not one penny for trib-
133. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
139. cf Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) ("Although thepolicy limits
define the amount for which the insured may be held responsible in performing the contract, they do
not define the amount for which it may be liable upon a breach.").
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ute'1" ° may be honored in the breach,"' but it expresses a vision of the
insurance company that permeates the claims stories.
Yet, as the legal realists have explained, in enforcing the limits of a
contract the courts also define those limits. 2 While that lesson hardly
seems revolutionary after cases like Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. 3 and C & J Fertilizer v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., " it adds
an important gloss to the claims stories' vision of insurance as a public
trust: The costs of insurance coverage litigation are appropriately borne by
the insurance fund, not only because that litigation helps reject improper
claims, but also because that litigation defines what is a proper claim.
Courts cannot possibly resolve all disputed insurance claims, but they
can, and do, through insurance coverage litigation, set standards for
insurance companies' resolution of claims.45 Thus, the insurance com-
panies' "millions" are not just for defense, they are also for the mainten-
ance of the regulatory structure that makes the insurance enterprise
possible. The millions spent by policyholders who prevail in insurance
coverage litigation are no less essential to this structure.
Put perhaps more concretely, an insured who prevails in a coverage
case increases the value of the insurance company's promise to all its
policyholders. Each of these other policyholders faces the risk of later
being in the position of the insured in the coverage case. Thanks to the
efforts of that insured, that position has become far stronger. The costs of
successful insureds are appropriately borne by the premium-paying public
because, as the claims stories stress, it is the members of that public who
are the beneficiaries of the insurance contract constructed through this
effort.1
4
140. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
142. See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Conuract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 562 (1933) ("[T]he
notion that in enforcing contracts the state is only giving effect to the will of the parties rests upon an
utterly untenable theory as to what the enforcement of contracts involves."); Karl N. Llewellyn, What
Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 712 (1931) (describing how courts create
new legal obligations by enforcing previously unenforceable promises).
143. 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960). The Henningsen court invalidated an express warranty that limited
remedies to the repair and replacement of the damaged parts because the limitation on liability was
"inimical to the public good." Id. at 95.
144. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). The C & J Fertilizer court permitted the insured to recover,
despite the literal language of the contract, under the doctrines of "reasonable expectations" and
"unconscionability." Id. at 179.
145. As discussed in supra note 50, the connection between appellate courts and claims adjusters
is not mechanical. See supra note 50. That the law of the adjuster differs from the law of the appellate
courts does not mean, however, that standards set by appellate courts do not affect insurance claims
practice. C. BouDIwEu, supra note 50, at 108 ("[Tlhe official definition of reality is part of a full
definition of social reality .... ).
146. C. John P. Dawson, Lawyers andlnvoluntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1597, 1600-01 (1974) ("[No policy is undermined by allowing recovery [for attorney fees]
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C. Beyond the Claims Stories
In their "for-public-consumption" form, the claims stories feature
insurance companies who offer to pay what they owe, "not one penny
more or less." These insurance companies never engage in strategic be-
havior designed to reduce their liability from that which a court might
decide is owed, especially when dealing with their insureds. Yet the
money-for-promise arrangement makes delay a powerful strategic tool
insurance companies can use against claimants, a tool that under the
prevailing application of contract damages doctrine is nearly cost free.47
In a state adhering to traditional insurance contract damages limitations and
an intent-based bad faith standard, an insurance company with a weak, but
colorable, defense to a claim will almost never have to pay more in real
dollars than was owed at the time the claim was presented.
Not surprisingly, there is good evidence that insurance companies do
engage in strategic behavior with claimants. A careful study of civil jury
trials in California strongly suggests that insurance companies systematic-
ally engage in strategic behavior with third-party claimants.1" The
available evidence of strategic behavior with insureds is more anecdotal,
but still significant. The fact patterns reported in the bad faith decisions
indicate such strategic behavior,49 as do my interviews of adjusters."5
where the claim for reimbursement can be deflected toward a stranger-where a litigant, suing on a
cause of action of his own, has succeeded and it then appears that his success has ensured gains of
nonparty strangers.").
147. The recovery of prejudgment interest complicates, but does not change in any fundamental
way, this analysis. While there may be times when the statutory interest rate exceeds the market
interest rate (as in Florida in late 1993), that phenomenon is likely to be short lived. In any event, for
every insured who litigates and collects prejudgment interest, there are undoubtedly many in the same
position who do not.
148. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No:A Study of Settlement Negotiations and
the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 319, 378 (1991) (discussing evidence of strategic
behavior by civil defendants).
149. See supra notes 82, 83, 86, and 103; supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also MFA
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flint, 574 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tenn. 1978) (describing the insurance company
representative's purposeful failure to inform the insureds of the extent of coverage prior to negotiating
a settlement).
150. While only one (former) adjuster said he paid insureds less than they were entitled to in order
to save the company money, Interview with anonymous former independent adjuster, in Coral Gables,
Fla. (May 24, 1994) (on file with author), others reported practices that amountto the same thing. For
example, one adjuster acknowledged that insureds with property damage claims are paid more when
they are represented by a public adjustor. Interview with anonymous independent adjuster, Florida
Department of Insurance Mediation Center, Homestead, Fla. (July 14, 1993). One adjuster stated that
some (other) adjusters act like their job is to save the insurance company money and underpay claims
to achieve that result. Interview with anonymous in-house adjuster, Florida Department of Insurance
Mediation Center, Homestead, Fla. (July 14, 1993). A third adjuster offered that it is common practice
for some adjusters to use estimates of the value of damage as "a starting point to work down from."
Interview with anonymous independent adjuster, Florida Department of Insurance Mediation Center,
Homestead, Fla. (July 27, 1993) (on file with author). In addition, I have observed adjusters in
mediations taking "legal" positions that were contrary to the public position of their company. In his
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Perhaps most significantly, insurance trade literature reveals, maybe
inadvertently, a "shadow" side of claims handling that differs significantly
from the for-public-consumption claims stories."'
The presence of strategic behavior with insureds provides an important
answer to the criticism that increasing insurance contract damages will lead
insurance companies to pay many claims that they should not.152 That
criticism is based on the implicit assumption that insurance adjuster
"errors"153 are equally distributed in favor of and against insurance com-
panies. If, as the strategic behavior suggests, such errors are more heavily
weighted in favor of insurance companies, then imposing a cost on those
that favor the insurance company would tend to correct the imbalance.
study, Ross noted that adjusters frequently fail to mention legal rules that are favorable to insureds, and
he observed that "the adjuster sees his job as being to reduce the valid claim to an appropriate size."
Ross, supra note 48, at 45, 166-70.
151. Space limitations in this Symposiumprohibit a detailed analysis of this literature. One strik-
ing example comes from the March 1970 Mutual Loss Managers' Conference, as reported in Winning
Replies, supra note 55, at 38. Before the conference, a set of typical policyholder complaints was
circulated to members of the Mutual Loss Research Bureau, who competed to draft the best answers.
At the conference, the complaints and the winning answers were read aloud. "A highlight of the
complaint answering session was the insertion of a 'mystery voice' answer to each question, delivered
from a hidden microphone and prepared 'strictly for fun' .... ." Id. One example follows:
"What do you mean it's excluded? You give it to us in the big print, and the small
print takes it away."
Mystery Voice-"I thought I recognizedyou. You're the same guy who accusedrme
last year of getting a percentage of every dollar I saved the company, and then wrote to
my boss and got my percentage reduced."
Winning answer by J.T. Posey, Kemper Cos.-Handling an excluded loss is
always unpleasant, but I'm sure you understand that a policy, like any business contract,
has to have some limitations. Otherwise, the premium would be prohibitive.. . "
Id. (emphasis in original); cf. SIGMUND FREUD, JOKES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS
102-03 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1960) (describing how "hostile" jokes "achieve in a roundabout
way the enjoyment ofovercoming [an enemy]"). Other indications of this shadow side include a steady
stream of articles and letters in Insurance Adjuster decrying the settlement practices of the unethical
adjuster. See. e.g., B. David Hinkle, The Great Consumer Swell and the Adjuster, INS. ADJUSTER,
July 1974, at 43, 44 (recounting common examples of unethical handling of claims by adjusters of
"yesteryear"); Benjamin Horton, Consumerism and Adjusting, INS. ADJUSTER, Mar. 1971, at 14, 16
("Unfortunately for the rest of us, some adjusters reach arbitrary conclusions without any adequate
justification for their position."); Kopta, supra note 75, at 5 ("The insurance industry can no longer
afford to risk the serious consequences of public reaction certain to result from other than the most
scrupulous treatment of all claimants.. ."); Tom O'Day, Just Reflecting, INS. ADJUSTER, Mar. 1969,
at 5 (noting that the unethical bebavior of some insurance adjusters can reflect poorly on the entire
industry because the public tends to generalize insurance adjusters); Tom O'Day, Just Reflecting, INs.
ADJUSTER, Feb. 1969, at 5 ("Like one bad apple in a basketful, one cheap, unfair settlement can cause
ripples of discontent and therefore create a bad public image for the industry."); Clif Ross, INS.
ADJUSTER, Feb. 1971, at 43 (letter to the editor) (condemning "a small hard core segment of claims
people who never say 'pay' till [sic) they see the whites of the juries [sic] eyes").
152. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTINGRISK: INSURANCE, LEGALTHEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 184-88 (1986) (positing that the strategic behavior of insurers puts the risk of nonpersuasion
on insureds and that increasing damages in the bad faith case merely equalizes the insurer's advantage
with the risk of payment of unworthy claims).
153. In this Paper, I assign to the term "error" the admittedly problematic definition, "a result
significantly different from that a court would provide."
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While providing complete compensatory damages in the ordinary coverage
case cannot end strategic behavior (that would be more than any court
could do), a broader contract damages rule allowing recovery for attorneys'
fees and emotional damages can alter the strategic calculus, so that a
mistaken refusal to pay imposes a cost on the insurance company as well
as the insured. Modest as that goal may be, it does seem worth
attempting.
IV. Conclusion
In this Paper, I have argued that insurance companies tell stories about
insurance that courts can use (and implicitly have used) as a source for the
"unwritten" obligations of the insurance relationship. Studying these
insurance stories can help flesh out those obligations and can also help
explain why courts draw the doctrinal lines that they do. My discussion
of insurance contract damages illustrated, in a concrete way, both functions
of this analysis. The insurance stories help explain why judges distinguish
between good and bad faith in deciding insurance coverage cases. The
stories also suggest hat the damages available on the good faith side of the
line ought to be broadened and that the damages available on the bad faith
side ought to be about punishment, not compensation.
Although I largely have confined my arguments about damages doc-
trine to those suggested by the insurance stories, the damages rule the
stories would apply-complete compensation in the good faith insurance
case-is desirable for at least one reason that goes beyond the logic of the
stories. Providing complete compensatory damages in the good faith insur-
ance case should reduce the extent of insurance bad faith actions and, thus,
the costly struggle for the rhetorical high ground epitomized by my use of
King Lear and King Richard III. If this Paper has accomplished anything,
it has demonstrated that both Kng Lear and King Richard III represent, at
least potentially, equally accurate visions of the insurance relationship.
Insurance coverage litigation is, as I have said, simultaneously about aban-
donment and greed. Deciding which vision best captures the dynamics of
a particular case is a profoundly difficult (and therefore time consuming
and expensive) question. Any legal rule that reduces the need to answer
that question, without undercutting the insurance relationship, bears serious
examination on that ground alone.
If insureds can obtain complete compensation without proving bad
faith, at least some should forgo that claim, notwithstanding the punitive-
damages pot of gold that sometimes awaits. Furthermore, if judges know
that insureds can get complete compensation without showing bad faith,
they should feel more free to limit that cause of action to cases involving
true betrayal, thereby reducing the likelihood of the pot of gold (and
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further reducing the number of those who seek to prove bad faith).,"5
The salutary result should be less concern about the intent of insurance
adjusters, more concern about the harm suffered by people who do not get
paid when they should, and maybe even (though this might be too much to
hope for) less insurance coverage litigation.55
154. Cf. Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 352 S.E.2d 73, 81 (W. Va. 1986). The
Hayseeds court stated:
Our reading of the cases throughout the United States on bad faith settlement leads
us to conclude that the result that we have just articulated concerning attorneys' fees and
damages for economic loss and inconvenience are what many other courts have been
trying to achieve by indirect means. But by achieving these desirable results through the
ad hoc manipulation of highly subjective criteria [i.e., bad faith], the rules have become
unpredictable and confusing.
Id.
155. Havingjst read Professor Stone's very thought-provokingcommentary, Promises and Public
Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law Through Stories, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1435 (1994), I have three
comments in response.
First, I agree that the insurance stories can be used to make a persuasive case for state
intervention in the insurance relationship. See id. at 1435 (asserting that "a regime of markets and
contracts cannot adequately handle the inescapable tensions revealed by the stories"). Where I differ
here is principally in the focus of the argument. I have two goals for this Paper: to tell the stories (so
that others, like Professor Stone, can use them) and to describe how they play out in a narrow doctrinal
setting. I see my primary audience as a particular aspect of the state: judges and people who try to
influencejudges. I do not think that Professor Stone means to suggest that judges should do nothing
to address "the inescapable tensions revealed by the stories," but rather that judicial solutions alone are
not enough. Id. I agree. Nevertheless, it would be a profound mistake for one importsnt group of
people who constitute the state-judges-to abdicate their responsibility for helping to construct
(through contract and tort law) an adequate insurance r lationship on the grounds that some other group
of people, who also constitute the state, might also have some responsibility for the adequacy of that
relationship. See id. at 1440 (observing that it is "hard to imagine that case-by-case damages-either
in contract or in tort-will induce general good faith and fair dealing").
Second, Professor Stone's observation that insurance companies witch from paternalistic
(bilateral) to democratic (multilateral) rhetoric during the move from the sales to the claima moment
in the insurance relationship is a signifieant contribution. Id. at 1443-44. I am not sure that the term
"profit-seeking" captures the "private" goal of insurance companies, or that they all have the same
goal. See id. at 1444 ("As a profit seeker, the insurer has no inherent incentive to preserve the
common purposes of the community of policyholders it serves."). But there is no doubt that there is
a private goal (or goals) that both the sales and claims stories help to mask and that this rhetorical move
plays an important part in that masking.
Finally, with respect to the boundary between tort and contract law, I intended to be more
agnostic than Professor Stone reads me. See id. at 1437 ("In arguing for expanded damages under
ordinary contract law-that is, without shifting ground to tort law-Baker would, in effect, allow
insurer advertising to become part of the contract."). My goal here is less to take a position with
respect to the boundary than to speak to judges who have decided that insurance lies on the contract
side. I am troubled that courts do not award complete compensation without proof of an insurer's bad
intent. I prefer the label "contract" over the label "tort" simply because courts traditionally have not
conditioned contract damages on findings of bad intent. A strict liability tort action might obtain the
same result, but it would be a much harder sell. Nor do I understand that my method here is radical.
See id. at 1437 (characterizing Baker's approach as "a radical step"). The fact that the "form" and
the "contract" are not necessarily coextensive was extensively discussed by the Legal Realists in the
early part of this century and had been recognized (while perhaps not acknowledged) by judges long
before then. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 95, at 704 (asserting that unreasonable
elements in form contracts may be voided by judges). All I have done is articulate what judges are
already doing when they look beyond the form.

